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Abstract: Disqualification challenges against international investment arbitrators are increasing. This poses a great challenge for the legitimacy of the international investment regime. The aim of the Article is to trace the source of this
development and to propose ways for the future structuring of an international
investment regime that is both transparent and effective. Legal literature understands arbitrator independence as a standard imposed by legal rules. This does
not capture the reality of international investment arbitration, especially in the
framework of the ICSID Convention, which seems to set a lower standard of independence for ICSID arbitrators.
This Article presents the latest trends in the challenge process based on an empirical study of the most recent ICSID tribunal decisions. The thesis of the Article is that arbitral independence in international investment arbitration is the
result of a “process of communication” among different actors and prompted by
the arbitration community itself. Arbitral independence is only partially a result
of legal rules. It is also a consequence of the creation of a tightly connected
community of international arbitrators that has been established over the years
of arbitral practice and which has transposed their ethos and professional practices onto investment arbitration. This community has constructed a very high
standard of independence for international investment arbitration, which is now
set in motion by other actors involved in the field. The Article proposes finally
the introduction of a new system of control in international investment arbitration that can address the peculiarities of the constructed process of the creation
of investor-state arbitration: certification.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial independence is usually understood as a functional concept
serving either the establishment of the rule of law and due process,1 or the
work of judges.2 This understanding reflects a predominantly domestic context where institutions are more established and legal concepts more defined than in international law. In the uncertain, complex, and fragmented
international legal order,3 with a far smaller historical record, institutions
and concepts cannot be taken for granted; their existence and meaning is
very often constructed by the actors involved in the field. Independence of
international adjudicators is a perfect example of the constructed development of international law. Given the judicialization of international investment arbitration,4 there is increasing attention to the need for independence
of international investment arbitrators.5 The cases in which concerns have
1

Anja Seibert-Fohr, Judicial Independence – The Normativity of an Evolving Transnational Principle, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN TRANSITION 1279, 1353–56 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012).
2
Yuval Shany, Judicial Independence as an Indicator of International Court Effectiveness: A GoalBased Approach, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 251 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012).
3
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENT 87–94 (2012).
4
See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 L. & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 47, 59–67 (2010).
5
See, e.g., Sam Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration: Lessons from International
Commercial Arbitration, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 445 (Chester
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) [hereinafter Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration];
Noah Rubins & Bernhard Lauterburg, Independence, Impartiality and Duty of Disclosure in Investment
Arbitration, in INVESTMENT AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES 153
(Christina Knahr et al. eds., 2010); Gabriel Bottini, Should Arbitrators Live On Mars? Challenge Of
Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 341 (2009); Federica Cristani,
Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Investment Arbitration: An Overview, 13
L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 153 (2014); Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., Arbitrator
Independence and Impartiality: Examining the Dual Role of Arbitrator and Counsel, IV Annual Forum
for Developing Country Investment Negotiators Background Papers, New Delhi, 27–29, Oct. 2010
(IISD, 2011); James Crawford, Challenges to Arbitrators in ICSID Arbitrations, Confronting Global
Challenges: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Investor-State Arbitration, PCSA Peace Palace Centenary
Seminar (Oct. 11, 2013).
Many commentators treat the issue of independence in international commercial and investment arbitration in the same context. See, e.g., H.E. Markus Buechel, The Independence of International Arbitrators,
in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL
CHALLENGES 243 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012); Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic
Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 3 J.
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been raised, and challenges against arbitrators have been filed, are increasing.6 Arbitrator practice also views the field as increasingly judicialized
with a need for more independence.7
Over the last years, international legal documents, scholars, and practitioners involved in investment law have developed a standard of independence of international investment arbitrators similar to that which applies to
domestic and international judges. A natural consequence of this development is the increasing rate of challenges against arbitrators in the different
arbitral fora. As of June 30, 2014, the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes8 had registered 473 cases under the ICSID Convention
and Additional Facility Rules.9 Out of these cases, 68 arbitrators were subINT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1 (2013); K. V. S. K. Nathan, The Independence of Arbitrators, 68 AMICUS
CURIAE 18, 22 (2006); William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 629, 635 (2009); JONATHAN COTTON, SLAUGHTER AND MAY, HOW TO CHALLENGE AN
ARBITRATOR’S
INDEPENDENCE
AND
IMPARTIALITY
1
(May
2008),
https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1428119/how_to_challenge_an_arbitrators_independence_an
d_impartiality_may_2008.pdf. The same questions also arise in the field of international commercial
arbitration. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Behavioral Analysis of Arbitral Decision Making, in
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 319
(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) [hereinafter Drahozal, Arbitral Decision
Making]; SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE
NEED FOR A ‘REAL DANGERS’ TEST (2009) [hereinafter LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]; Leon E. Trakman, The Impartiality and Independence of
International Arbitrators Reconsidered, 10 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 999 (2007); Felipe Mutis Tellez, Arbitrators’ Independence and Impartiality: A Review Of SCC Board Decisions on Challenges to Arbitrators (2010-2012) (unpublished, on file with the author); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral
Analysis of Private Judging, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, Private Judging]; Baiju S. Vasani & Shaun A. Palmer, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators at ICSID: A
New Dawn?, 30 ICSID REV. 194 (2014) and CHALLENGES AND RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND
ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2015) were published
when the present Article was in the final editing process and have not been considered.
6
Undeniably, “there has been a recent uptick in challenges to arbitrators.” Charles B. Rosenberg,
Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 27 J. INT’L ARB. 505, 506 (2010).
7
See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of the Award
Rendered on 20 August 2007, ¶ 231 (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/documents/
VivendiSecondAnnulmentDecision.pdf (“It may have been possible at first to consider Professor Kaufmann-Kohler’s attitude in these matters as a one-off serious lapse of judgment but her removal by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Yukos cases after her refusal voluntarily to withdraw appears to
confirm that she has more broadly a view of her independence and of the relevant criteria in this connection which do not or do no longer accord with the minimum standards that now prevail in these matters”).
8
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS
AND
RULES
(Apr.
10,
2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES].
9
See ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS (ISSUE 2014-2) 7 (2014),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202014-
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ject to a challenge procedure.10 Most proposals for arbitrator disqualification in ICSID have been brought forward only in the last few years. The
empirical study of the most recent ICSID tribunal disqualification awards
reveals some changes in the disqualification standard of review of arbitral
independence, the challenge process, and the final decisions of the deciding
authorities.11 The aim of this Article is to trace the source of this development and to propose ways for the future structuring of an international investment regime that is both transparent and effective.
In the volatile and uncertain world of international law,12 international
courts have had difficulties adapting. The flexibility of international arbitration is one reason why international investment arbitration has been so successful in recent years and especially since the late 1990s.13 International
investment tribunals operate as functional equivalents to courts in international law. For this reason, and under the guidance of the arbitration community, investor-state tribunals had to operate under similar independence
standards in order to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the international
community.
The thesis of the Article is that the quest for arbitral independence is
the result of a “process of communication”14 and interaction between the
members of the international arbitration community, states, international
organizations, arbitration houses, and international courts prompted by the
arbitration community.15 Arbitral independence is only partially a result of
2%20(English).pdf.
10
The present study builds on KAREL DAELE, CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 455–61 (2012). The relevant information is obtained
primarily from Newly Posted Awards, Decisions & Materials, ITALAW, http://www.italaw.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
11
It is unfortunately difficult to collect similar data on investment cases in other fora like the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Chamber of Commerce. The Article will also not be
dealing with the related and very interesting latest occurrence of the exclusion of counsel. See Hrvatska
Elektroprivreda v. Slovenia, Tribunal’s Ruling Regarding the Participation of David Mildon QC in Further Stages of the Proceedings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24 (May 6, 2008), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC950_En&caseId=C69;
Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision of the Tribunal on the Participation of a Counsel (Jan. 14, 2010), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1370_En&caseId=C72.
12
REISMAN, supra note 3.
13
See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3 (Apr. 10, 2013); ICSID, supra note 9.
14
See W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101, 101 (1981).
15
See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996)
[hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE] (on the role of the arbitration community in the
construction of international arbitration). A similar influence of lawyers in the construction of international legal fields has been observed also in other areas. The relevant literature is rapidly growing; see
generally
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legal rules. A comparison between adjudication fora shows that there are
great similarities and great differences between the independence guarantees of international judges and those of international arbitrators. Both types
of adjudicators share three common standards of personal independence: (a)
qualifications of the adjudicators; (b) rules on disclosure (and investigation), primarily concerning possible conflicts of interest; and (c) challenge
rules. However, standards of organizational independence such as safeguards regarding tenure and salaries are not shared and apply only to judges. Arbitral independence is rather the effect of the creation of a tightly
connected community of international arbitrators that has been established
over the years of arbitral practice.16 It is largely the same community of
people that deals with international investment cases in the international investment fora. They have transposed their ethos and professional practices
onto the investment law regime and arbitration.
The international arbitration community applies the higher “appearance of bias” standard of international courts to the evaluation of arbitral
independence. The standard is also usually applied in the ICSID framework, despite Articles 14 and 57 of the ICSID Convention seemingly setting a different standard of independence, namely “manifest lack of independent judgment.” This is substantially lower than the appearance of bias
LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth
eds., 2012); LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Yves Dezalay & Bryant
G. Garth eds., 2011); THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE
(Scott L. Cummings ed., 2011); see also ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF
EMPIRE (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2010) (on the role of lawyers in institutional reform in
Asia); A HISTORY OF LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE GATT/WTO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF
LAW IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (Gabrielle Z. Marceau ed., 2015) (on the role of lawyers
in the World Trade Organization); THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS,
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G.
Garth eds., 2002) (concerning the role of lawyers in institution-building in Latin America); LAW AND
THE FORMATION OF MODERN EUROPE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Mikael Rask Madsen & Chris Thornhill eds., 2014) (on the role of lawyers in the transformation of Europe); LAWYERING EUROPE: EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD (Antoine Vauchez &
Bruno de Witte eds., 2013); Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise
and Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231 (2006) (on the
role of lawyers in the construction of the field of human rights); John Hagan, Ron Levi & Gabrielle Ferrales, Swaying the Hand of Justice: The Internal and External Dynamics of Regime Change at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 585 (2006) (on the role of
lawyers in the construction of international criminal law); cf. also Mikael Rask Madsen, Sociological
Approaches to International Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
388, 392 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014) (on similar transformations in
the field of European human rights); ANTOINE VAUCHEZ & LAURENT WILLEMEZ, LA LUSTICE FACE À
SES RÉFORMATEURS (1980–2006): ENTREPRISES DE MODERNISATION ET LOGIQUES DE RÉSISTANCES
(2007) (concerning the role of lawyers in the reform of the French judicial system); Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European Court of Human Rights at
the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007).
16
See DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTURE, supra note 15, passim.
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standard that applies in international courts and other fora of international
arbitration. Still, the arbitration community usually adheres to an interpretation beyond the grammar of Articles 14 and 57 in its willingness to be and
appear to be independent to the outside world. The ultimate manifestation
of the willingness of the arbitration community to be and appear independent is the International Bar Association’s “Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration,”17 which are practically identical on the issues of the independence standard and the functional independence and
impartiality to the statutes of international courts and “The Burgh House
Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary.”18
In ICSID, a modified appearance of bias standard as reflected in the
recent case law of ICSID tribunals is applicable. The Article proposes,
though, the application of the non-modified appearance of bias standard for
the chairperson of the tribunal. The differences between the two standards
are the burden of proof of the challenging party and the disqualification
standard of review of the deciding authority. The challenging party has to
pass a higher bar in order to prove dependence or partiality of the partyappointed arbitrator in comparison to the chairperson of the tribunal; the
deciding authority—either the unchallenged arbitrators, or the Chairperson
of the Administrative Council of ICSID—should apply good faith review in
the case of the party-appointed arbitrators in comparison to full substantive
review in the case of the chairperson.
Given current dissatisfaction among some participants and observers
with both the overall structure of the investor-State arbitration and the results it produces,19 several proposals have been put forward as alternatives
to the current system.20 This Article argues an arbitrator certification system
is the best solution.
This Article’s analysis of the construction of arbitral independence reveals that the best way to improve the overall investor-state arbitration sys17

INT’L BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(2004),
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=21D27F55-134B-4791-A01CF8B6658BAB24 [hereinafter IBA GUIDELINES].
18
Study Group of the International Law Association on the Practice and Procedure of International
Courts and Tribunals, in association with the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (adopted
June 2004), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/burgh_final_21204.pdf [hereinafter Burgh House Principles].
19
See generally Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (2014).
20
See, e.g., UNCTAD, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/4 (June 13, 2013) (discussing five main reform paths, namely
promoting ADR, tailoring the existing system through individual international investment agreements,
limiting investor access to ISDS, introducing an appeals facility and creating a standing international
investment court); see generally THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS,
REALITIES, OPTIONS (Jose E. Alvarez et al. eds., 2011).
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tem is by focusing on the arbitration community, the arbitrators and their
qualities, rather than on any major institutional reform. A solution cannot
include fundamental changes to the legal and institutional framework if it is
to be at all viable and accepted by all players in the field. The proposal put
forward in this Article is to regulate investor-state arbitration in a completely different way than the alternatives proposed so far, by introducing a new
system of control21 in international investment arbitration that can address
the peculiarities of investor-state arbitration: arbitrator certification.22 The
proposed certification system shifts the focus from the institutions to the arbitration community and the person of the arbitrator,23 and certification becomes extremely relevant in view of the discussions on the adoption of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the TransPacific Partnership (TPP).
Part II of the Article introduces the issues of arbitral independence.
First, it presents a recent case from a non-investment law forum, an Article
VII United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea Tribunal. The decision in the disqualification challenge between Mauritius v. U.K. is important to the independence of international arbitrators since it deals with
several open issues and involves many of the specialists in the field, either
as arbitrators, counsel, or experts.24 Caratube v. Kazakhstan, one of the latest decisions on a disqualification challenge from an ICSID tribunal, is a
major step towards further crystallization of the rapidly evolving ICSID
case law.25 The remainder of Part II compares the independence standards
applicable in the various international courts. Independence guarantees in
the statutes of the four courts with universal jurisdiction have been identified: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal Court, and the
21

See generally MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
(1992); W. Michael Reisman, Reflections on the Control
Mechanism of the ICSID System, 6 REV. INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 197 (2010); W. Michael Reisman,
The Breakdown Of The Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739 (1989).
22
See also Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to
Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN J. INT’L L. 53, 62 n.53, 121 & n.383 (2005) (“Finally, as
some have already suggested for the domestic context, perhaps the time has come for licensing or certification procedures to regulate arbitrator conduct. These steps are inevitable as the pool of international
arbitrators transforms from being an ad hoc collection of highly talented independent contractors into a
fully formed profession.”).
23
See also Rogers, supra note 22, at 82–106 (developing a functional approach to the regulation of
arbitrators).
24
See Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, Reasoned
Decision on Challenge, PCA Case. No. 2011-3/1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011), http://pcacpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1782.
25
Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch (Mar. 20,
2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf.
AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR
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World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB). The Article then
discusses independence standards in the rules of the most important arbitration houses like the International Chamber of Commerce and the London
Court of International Arbitration, and turns quickly to issues that are more
relevant to international investment arbitration, especially the discussion of
the independence guarantees of ICSID tribunals where most investment
cases are adjudicated.
The nature of independence among international investment arbitrators
entails only part of the guarantees of independence that international judges
enjoy. Still, international investment arbitrators are considered to be independent and strive to give an appearance of non-biased decisionmaking towards governments and investors. Part III traces the reasons for this development in international investment law. First, the international arbitration
community has transposed its ethos onto the international investment regime; second, the functional equivalence of arbitration and judicial settlement in international dispute resolution has brought about common standards.
Part IV discusses five reform proposals that have been put forward for
an institutional re-shaping of international investment arbitration, namely:
abolishing party-appointed arbitrators; introducing an appeal mechanism or
standing international investment court; adopting Codes of Conduct; or returning to a combination of diplomacy and domestic courts. The Article explains why these proposals are not viable solutions for the reform of international investment arbitration. The Article then proposes introducing a
new system of control in international investment arbitration, which has
been tested in the field of mediation: certification. Based on a functional
understanding of the field of international investment arbitration,26 the reform proposal focuses less on institutions and more on the attributes of the
arbitration community. After all, it is arbitrators who have the most influence on the quality of the arbitration system.27
II. INDEPENDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORS
According to several accounts, the field of international investment ar26

See Rogers, supra note 22, at 109 (footnotes omitted) (“This sketch of the universal core features
of international arbitrators provides a basis for a definition of the arbitrator’s functional role, from which
it is possible to outline broadly the structure of arbitrator ethics.”). According to the functional approach,
ethical obligations cannot simply be transplanted from other professions, but must instead be derived
from the nature of the decisionmaker’s role. See also CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 338–39 (2014).
27
Cf. Erik Voeten, International Judicial Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 421, 424 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (“An independent judge is thus not by definition a good judge;
although good judges tend to be independent.”).
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bitration is undergoing a phase of judicialization similar to that observed in
other international regimes.28 The unfolding concerns regarding arbitral independence seem to corroborate these accounts.29 Due to judicial globalization of the international legal order in general, judicial independence has
become a pressing issue in international courts and tribunals. There is increasing attention to not only the need for independence of international
judges generally, but also the need for independent international commercial30 and international investment arbitrators. The number of cases filed
raising concerns and challenges against arbitrators is increasing, and the arbitral profession confronts a growing need for independence. This Chapter
discusses two of the most important recent cases for the development of the
law of independence in international investment arbitration: Mauritius v.
U.K. and Caratube v. Kazakhstan, which highlight how both the substance
and process of decisionmaking is critically important. The discussion then
turns to the development of a global standard of international adjudicator
independence and compares it with the applicable standard in international
investment arbitration. This part then discusses the peculiarities of the
ICSID framework and how it has been interpreted and applied in the most
recent case law.
A. An Increasing Trend in International Arbitration: Two Recent
Cases
1. Mauritius v. U.K.
This well-reasoned decision on a disqualification proposal by a Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention for the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has considered all the issues regarding arbitral
independence in international law.31 The challenge arose out of a law of the
sea case between the Republic of Mauritius and the U.K. Many of the key
figures in international dispute settlement were involved in this case.32 This
28

See Sweet, supra note 4, at 47. Sweet mentions four judicialization indicators that apply to Investor-State arbitration: the creation of precedent; the adoption of balancing techniques; the admission of
amicus briefs; and the push for appellate supervision of arbitral awards. These are substantive indicators
of judicialization that prove the existence of at least the arbitrators’ judge-like function in view of the
new and evolving governance field of Investor-State arbitration.
29
Gus Van Harten, for example, criticizes the lack of independence of Investor-State arbitrators and
the delegation of the judicial function of the states to arbitration panels. See GUS VAN HARTEN,
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 172 (2007).
30
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5, particularly Drahozal, Private Juding, at 105, and Drahozal,
Arbitral Decision Making, at 319.
31
See Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, Reasoned
Decision on Challenge, PCA Case. No. 2011-3/1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011), http://pcacpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1782.
32
They include: Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum, a German national, as arbitrator appointed by Mauritius;
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elevated the case to a battle about the applicable independence standard for
adjudicators in international law, making the case relevant for the investment arbitration framework as well.
Mauritius challenged Judge Greenwood, the arbitrator appointed by
the UK, and this challenge was decided by the remaining arbitrators. The
challenge was based on four grounds:33
(i) [Judge Greenwood’s] involvement with the United Kingdom on
legal matters touching directly or indirectly on [the object of the dispute];
(ii) his involvement with the United Kingdom on the application of
the European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) to the
Chagos Archipelago or to the British overseas territories;
(iii) his intention to seek reelection to the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”); and
(iv) his service on the Appointments Board for the new Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

The Republic of Mauritius favored a contextual interpretation of the
relevant articles of the Convention that refer to the independence of international arbitrators, whereas it presented a very broad understanding of context with reference to the provisions of other international arbitration rules
and treaties and also to domestic case law. Article 2(1) UNCLOS Annex
VII reads:
A list of arbitrators shall be drawn up and maintained by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Every State Party shall be entitled to nominate four arbitrators, each of whom shall be a person experienced in maritime affairs and enjoying the highest reputation for
fairness, competence and integrity. The names of the persons so
Judge Sir Christopher Greenwood CMG QC, a British national, as arbitrator appointed by the U.K.;
Judge James Kateka, a Tanzanian national, and Judge Albert Hoffmann, a South African national, as
arbitrators; and Professor Ivan Shearer, an Australian national, as arbitrator and President of the Tribunal, appointed by the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) pursuant to
Article 3(e) of Annex VII of UNCLOS. Mauritius was represented, among others, by Professor James
Crawford SC, an Australian national and Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge,
who is currently a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Professor Philippe Sands QC, a British
national and Professor of International Law at University College London. Judge Thomas Mensah, and
Professors George Bermann, Kate Malleson and Yuval Shany also submitted opinions supporting the
positions of Mauritius. It is interesting to note that Crawford, Sands, Mensah, Shany and Malleson are
members of the International Law Association Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals which elaborated the “Burgh House Principles,” see supra note 18, at 1
(“Noting in particular that each court or tribunal has its own characteristics and functions and that in
certain instances judges serve on a part-time basis or as ad hoc or ad litem judges.”). Judge Gilbert Guillaume, and former Judge and President of the ICJ and predecessor of Judge Greenwood in the ICJ,
Dame Rosalyn Higgins submitted Statements in favor of the position of the U.K.
33
Mauritius v. United Kingdom, PCA Case. No. 2011-3/1, ¶ 10.
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nominated shall constitute the list.34

The U.K. took a more textual approach. Moreover, its understanding
of context was only with reference to the ICJ and ITLOS, which are the
other fora that can adjudicate UNCLOS disputes. ICJ, UNCLOS and Annex
VII provisions have the common unifying factor that they apply to interState disputes.
Additionally, both the U.K. and Judge Greenwood made the case
about the difference between inter-State and non-inter-State arbitration,
considering that—independent of what applies to the latter—a different
standard applies to the former. Namely, the applicable standard is not the
role/issue conflict standard of international commercial and Investor-State
arbitration but rather the lower “specific prior involvement standard,” which
calls for previous involvement in the specific case. This is the standard that
the ICJ applies in disqualification applications before it.35
According to Mauritius, the appearance of bias test was satisfied by
the “extremely close and longstanding relationship between Judge Greenwood and the United Kingdom.”36 According to the U.K., Judge Greenwood had had no prior involvement in the subject matter of the specific
case and thus the challenge should fail.37 The Tribunal, in agreement with
the U.K. and Judge Greenwood, held that principles and rules developed in
the context of international commercial and investment arbitration were not
applicable to inter-State disputes, such as the dispute in question.38 “The
Tribunal . . . decided that the law applicable to [this] arbitration [was] that
to be found in Annex VII of the Convention . . ., supplemented by the law
and practice of international courts and tribunals in inter-State cases.”39
34

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) (emphasis added); see also id. annex VII, art. 3(e) (Arbitration),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex7.htm:
Unless the parties agree that any appointment under subparagraphs (c) and (d) be made by a
person or a third State chosen by the parties, the President of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea shall make the necessary appointments. If the President is unable to act
under this subparagraph or is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, the appointment
shall be made by the next senior member of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
who is available and is not a national of one of the parties. The appointments referred to in
this subparagraph shall be made from the list referred to in article 2 of this Annex within a
period of 30 days of the receipt of the request and in consultation with the parties. The members so appointed shall be of different nationalities and may not be in the service of, ordinarily resident in the territory of, or nationals of, any of the parties to the dispute.
35
See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 2, 3 (2004); see also id. at 7 (Buergenthal, J., dissenting).
36
Mauritius v. United Kingdom, PCA Case No. 2011-3/1, ¶ 72.
37
Id. ¶ 84
38
Id. ¶¶ 165–168.
39
Id. ¶ 165; see also the Notes to the PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, OPTIONAL RULES FOR
ARBITRATING DISPUTES BETWEEN TWO STATES, which make clear that the PCA rules include modifica-
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Moreover, the Tribunal specifically rejected applying the International Bar
Association Guidelines, which have gained great importance in recent
years.
Based on this reasoning, the Tribunal concluded that a party challenging an arbitrator must demonstrate that under the standards applicable to inter-State cases there are justifiable grounds for doubting the independence
and impartiality of that arbitrator in a particular case.40 The reason for this is
that the “system of inter-[S]tate dispute settlement” is based on the consent
of the parties and, more specifically, upon the rules of public international
law as laid out in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.41 The Tribunal further
said that since it was undisputed that Judge Greenwood was not involved in
the dispute before he was appointed as arbitrator, Article 8(1) of the ITLOS
Statute could not serve as a ground for challenge.42 Regarding the further
claim concerning Judge Greenwood’s participation on the Board for the Selection of the U.K.’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office Legal Adviser, the
Tribunal said it had scrutinized his participation in that process with special
care since it occurred “simultaneously” with Judge Greenwood’s participation as an arbitrator in the case.43 Despite this scrutiny, the relationship between Judge Greenwood and the U.K. Government was not found to be
“continuing,” and as a result Mauritius’s challenge against Judge Greenwood was dismissed.
This result is extremely important both because of the subject matters
of the dispute and the persons involved. It is expected that the decision will
have a major impact on future arbitrator disqualification motions. The first
key finding of the Tribunal was that the proper inquiry concerning arbitral
independence is not whether actual bias or dependence upon a party exists
but instead whether there is an appearance of bias or lack of independence
or impartiality. The Tribunal’s second move, to differentiate between interState and private-private disputes, was less expected. One would have expected the Tribunal to apply higher standards of judicial independence in
inter-State cases, but the Tribunal took a restrictive approach to the socalled “issue-conflict question,” partly following the approach of the ICJ
statute and precedent. With this decision, the Tribunal has placed a great
trust on the power of the states to shape their contractual relationships with
other states.

tions, inter alia, “to reflect the public international law character of disputes between States, and diplomatic practice appropriate to such disputes,” which reflects the Rules’ origins in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
40
Mauritius v. United Kingdom, PCA Case No. 2011-3/1, ¶ 166.
41
Id. ¶ 167.
42
Id. ¶ 172.
43
Id. ¶ 181.
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2. Caratube v. Kazakhstan
Before going into an analysis of the standards of arbitral independence, it is worth looking at one of the most recent decisions on arbitrator
disqualification in the international investment law context. This decision
epitomizes the state of the art concerning the standard of arbitral independence. Caratube gives the arbitral community’s stamp of approval to recent
doctrinal shifts driven by an interplay between the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID and arbitrators sitting on various tribunals.
The challenge arose out of a dispute between Caratube International
Oil Company LLP, a Kazakh company, and Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani, a
U.S. national, on the claimant side, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, on the
other.44 The claimants raised their concerns in relation to Bruno Boesch, the
arbitrator of the respondent, who had been repeatedly appointed to serve as
co-arbitrator by the counsel for the respondent (the law firm Curtis, MalletPrevost, Colt & Mosle LLP), including in an UNCITRAL arbitration involving Kazakhstan, Ruby Roz Agricol v. The Republic of Kazakhstan. Pursuant to Article 58 of the ICSID Convention and Article 9(4) of the ICSID
Arbitration Rules, the unchallenged arbitrators, Laurent Lévy and Laurent
Aynès, had to decide on the disqualification.
First, the Tribunal laid out the substantive standard of review. Although not stated in Articles 57 and 14 of the ICSID Convention, it is generally accepted that arbitrators have to be not only independent but also impartial.45 Concerning the applicable legal standard, the Tribunal explained
this is “an ‘objective standard based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence by a third party’ or, in other words, on the ‘point of view of a reasonable and informed third person’”.46 It then clarified the meaning of the word
“manifest” in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention by stating that it “means
‘evident’ or ‘obvious’ in that it ‘relates to the ease with which the alleged

44

Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, ¶¶ 1–2.
Id. ¶ 52,which cites to some of the most recently decided cases, namely: Abaclat & Others v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority of
the Tribunal, ¶ 74 (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw3057.pdf; Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶ 65 (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3028.pdf; Repsol S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Francisco Orrego
Vicuña and Claus von Wobeser, ¶ 70 (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw3033.pdf; Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposal to Disqualify a Majority of the
Tribunal, ¶ 58 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw3009.pdf.
46
Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, ¶ 54 (quoting Blue Bank International
& Trust (Barbados) Ltd, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, ¶ 60).
45
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lack of [independence or impartiality] can be perceived.’”47 The Tribunal
explained that the lack of independence and impartiality is “evident” or
“obvious,” and therefore “manifest,” if it can be “discerned with little effort
and without deeper analysis.”48
As to the burden of proof, the parties even further divided and the Tribunal offered more precise reasoning.49 The claimants argued that the arbitrators must be disqualified if it is shown that there are “reasonable doubts”
as to their independence or impartiality. The respondent submitted that the
existence of reasonable doubts is not enough, and instead, the claimants
must submit clear evidence of the arbitrators’ lack of impartiality and independence. The Caratube Tribunal, composed of the unchallenged arbitrators, followed recent case law on this point as shaped by the Chairman of
the ICSID Administrative Council, Kim Yong Kim. The first relevant
ICSID case was Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which was followed as precedent by Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Repsol S.A. & Repsol Butano
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, & Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic.
In these cases, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council found
that “Articles 57 and 14(1) of the ICSID Convention do not require proof of
actual dependence or bias; rather it is sufficient to establish the appearance
of dependence or bias.”50
The Caratube Tribunal crystallizes the emerging new standard for arbitrator disqualification, but it does more, too. For the first time in investorState arbitration history, the unchallenged arbitrators, after discussing different claims made by the claimants, found that the claimants had demonstrated that a third party would have found that there was an evident or obvious appearance of a lack of impartiality or independence based on a
reasonable evaluation of the facts and that, therefore, Mr. Boesch manifestly lacked one of the qualities required by Article 14(1) of the ICSID Convention in this particular case and thus had to be disqualified.
B. A Global Standard of International Adjudicator’s Independence?
Independence is a defining feature of every dispute resolution system.
In the sections to follow, we will trace the variable of adjudicator independ47

Id. ¶ 55 (quoting Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20,

¶ 61).
48

Id. (quoting EDF International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Challenge Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ¶ 68 (June 25, 2008),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0262.pdf).
49
Id. ¶¶ 56–57.
50
Id. ¶ 57; Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, ¶ 59;
Burlington Resources, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, ¶ 66; Repsol S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
¶ 71; Abaclat & Others, ARB/07/5, ¶ 76.
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ence in legal texts, decisions, and studies of domestic and primarily international courts and tribunals. The standards which make up the judicial function vis-à-vis independence and impartiality are basically the same for national and international tribunals.51 Moreover, all international courts and
tribunals use a fairly similar legal standard of independence, including the
elements of independence, impartiality, and avoidance of the appearance of
bias.52 Comparisons between these standards will help us forge the necessary links between international investment arbitration and other international adjudication fora.53
1. Independence Guarantees of Domestic and International Judges
What does it mean to be an independent judge in the domestic setting?
According to a short meta-analysis conducted by the World Bank, a truly
independent judiciary has three characteristics:54 (a) it is independent in the
strict sense, meaning that there is no interference from the parties to the relevant disputes or other branches of government; (b) it is impartial, meaning
that its decisions are not influenced by the personal interest of the judge in
the outcome of the case; and (c) its decisions are enforced, meaning that a
court’s decision should be implemented, either in a voluntary or coerced
manner.
Empirical research in the field identifies similar characteristics of judicial independence. The comparative empirical work of Feld and Voigt, for
example, identifies variables of judicial independence and distinguishes and
measures de jure and de facto judicial independence.55 The study is based
on a questionnaire that has been sent to academics and practitioners in
countries all over the world. Their variables of de jure judicial independence are: (a) whether the highest courts are anchored in the constitution; (b)
how difficult is it to amend the constitution; (c) appointment procedures of
judges; (d) the length of tenure of judges; (e) whether there is a fixed re51

Karin Oellers-Frahm, International Courts and Tribunals, Judges and Arbitrators, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2013),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e45.
52
Id. ¶¶ 8, 30. According to Oellers-Frahm, these principles may even be considered as customary
international law. Id. ¶¶ 24, 30. The standards of all international courts and tribunals including the
ICSID provisions are largely based on the example of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
the ICJ. Id. ¶ 7.
53
According to Rogers, using the judicial standard as a referent for the definition of arbitrator independence and impartiality is misleading. Rogers, supra note 22, at 67–71, 81.
54
MATTHEW STEPHENSON, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT CAN BE MEASURED,
WHY
IT
OCCURS
1,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/
JudicialIndependence.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2016); cf. also, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985) and
G.A. Res. 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985), Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.
55
Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497, 498 (2003).
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tirement age of judges in the court; (f) removal procedures; (g) whether reelection of judges is possible; (h) protection and adequacy of the salary of
judges; (i) accessibility to the highest court; (j) procedure for the allocation
of cases in court; (k) judicial review powers; and (l) transparency of the
court. The variables of de facto judicial independence are: (a) average
length of tenure; (b) deviation of average length of tenure from de jure prescription; (c) number of judges removed from office; (d) frequency of
changes in the number of judges in the court; (e) real salary of judges; (f)
real court’s budget; (g) number of constitutional changes in the relevant articles; and (h) compliance by other branches with court rulings.
Due to the different setting in which they operate, international courts
sometimes present different questions with regard to the nature of judicial
independence in comparison to domestic courts.56 At the same time, if international courts intend to exert more influence, they must be expected to
establish a reputation for neutrality and objectivity.57 For this reason, judicial independence guarantees for international judges are largely the same
as those for domestic judges. Similar provisions are included in the statutes
of all four international courts with universal jurisdiction that are the subject
of our study, namely the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Criminal
Court, and the World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB).58
Following Feld and Voigt, we can break down the judicial independ56

For example, in the international setting, independence may refer primarily to possible influence
from governments, but also from multinational enterprises and non-governmental organizations.
57
Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2005).
58
See generally INDÉPENDANCE ET IMPARTIALITÉ DES JUGES INTERNATIONAUX [INDEPENDENCE
AND FAIRNESS OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES] (Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Jean-Marc Sorel eds., 2010); L.E.
Petteti, Independence of International Judges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY
DEBATE 496 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985); Voeten, supra note 27; DOMINIK
ZIMMERMANN, THE INDEPENDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE ADHERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY TO A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (2014);
Chester Brown, The Evolution and Application of Rules Concerning Independence of the “International
Judiciary,” 2 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS & TRIBUNALS 63, 65 (2003); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs,
Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1057 (2011);
Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271 (2003); Theodor Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 359 (2005); Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo,
93 CALIF. L. REV. 899 (2005); Yuval Shany & Sigall Horovitz, Judicial Independence in The Hague
and Freetown: A Tale of Two Cities, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 113 (2008); see also Steve Charnovitz, Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES 219 (Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes et al. eds., 2002) (on judicial independence the WTO); Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417
(2008) (on judicial independence in the European Court of Human Rights).
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ence guarantees into several subcategories. Qualitative analysis of the different provisions may lead us to a further distinction between two types of
judicial independence guarantees: they can be divided into functional/
personal guarantees and organizational guarantees. Functional independence guarantees refer to the function of decisionmaking and are addressed
to the person of the judge. They include primarily the “qualifications” of
judges.59 According to Article 2 of the ICJ Statute, for example, “the Court
shall be composed of a body of independent judges.” Further functional independence guarantees are, using the terms of Feld and Voigt, “conflict of
interest rules,”60 “rules on disclosure of conflicts of interest,”61 “challenge”
or “disqualification” rules,62 and “immunities.”63
Organizational guarantees refer to organizational safeguards in the
statutes of the courts dealing with the institutional separation of judges from
other branches of government, the parties, and in some cases other divisions
of the same or another court64 Typical organizational guarantees are, in
Feld and Voigt terms, “whether the courts are anchored in the international
treaty,” “how difficult it is to amend the court statute,”65 “appointment procedures of the judges,”66 “secure judicial tenure with fixed terms,”67 “fixed
retirement age of the judges in the court,” “existence of process for removal
59

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 36, 40, 45, opened for signature July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; DSU, Dispute
Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, Apr. 14, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU]; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea arts.
2, 11, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 [hereinafter ITLOS Statute]; Statute of
the International Court of Justice arts. 2, 20, opened for signature June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1051, 33
U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
60
See ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 16–17; ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, arts. 7–8; Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 41; World Trade Organization, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, annex
2, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6 (adopted Aug. 16, 2010).
61
See ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 8(2); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 24; International
Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 33, ICC-ASP/1/3 (1994); World Trade Organization, supra note 61.
62
See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 40(4); ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, arts. 8, 18; ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 14, 24, 34; World Trade Organization, supra note 61.
63
Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 48(2); ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 10 (see also Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, May 19–23,
1997, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/25); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 19; World Trade Organization, Rules of
Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, arts. II–
III, VI, WT/DSB/RC/1 (Dec. 11, 1996).
64
The organizational guarantees could be further divided into “core organizational issues,” “financial guarantees,” and “compliance provisions.”
65
See ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 41; ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 69–70.
66
See ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 4; Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 36; ITLOS Statute, supra
note 59, art. 4.
67
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 36(9)(a); ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 15(1); ICJ
Statute, supra note 59 art. 13(1).
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from office,”68 “re-election possibility,”69 “protection and adequacy of the
salary of the judges,”70 “accessibility to the court,”71 “procedure for allocation of cases in the court,”72 “judicial review powers,” “transparency of the
court,”73 and “compliance provisions.”74
There are no major differences in the functional independence guarantees in the four universal courts, and there are also many common features
in their organizational guarantees. The ICJ has relatively average organizational safeguards compared to the other courts, whereas it has the poorest
compliance provisions. ITLOS, despite having been established in 1996,
draws heavily on the provisions of the ICJ embodying the previous consensus on what was necessary for independence. The International Criminal
Court has some of the most up-to-date provisions for judicial independence
including non-renewable terms to insulate judges from possible political influence.75 The WTO AB has, compared to the other courts, the lowest safeguards in several categories including: “length of tenure,” having only fouryear terms compared to nine-year terms for the other courts; “protection and
adequacy of salary”; and “publication of decision and dissent,” being the
only court where dissents are usually not made public.76 In the WTO AB,
there is also no “process for removal from office,” which might allow for
some political influence from WTO members if such a question arises.77
But at the same time, it is also the only court that has a concrete “procedure
for the allocation of cases,” and includes “the fullest set of guarantees to assure compliance with its decisions.”
The distinctions will become very helpful in the analysis of arbitral independence since they can help us understand what parts of the legal safeguards are missing and in what ways the arbitration community has managed to strike a balance between the absence of legal rules and the
68

See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 46; ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, arts. 7, 9; ICJ Statute,
supra note 59, art. 18.
69
See Rome Statute, supra note 59, arts. 35, 36.
70
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 49; DSU, supra note 59, art. 17; ITLOS Statute, supra
note 59, art. 18(1), (5); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 32(5), (8).
71
See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 1; DSU, supra note 59, art. 17; ITLOS Statute, supra note
59, arts. 20, 21; ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts. 34, 35(1), 36.
72
See World Trade Organization, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, annex 2, Rules 3, 4, 5,
WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/6 (adopted Aug. 16, 2010).
73
Rome Statute, supra note 59, arts. 56, 57, 58; DSU, supra note 59, art. 18; ITLOS Statute, supra
note 59, arts. 50, 74, 83; Rome Statute, supra note 59, arts. 17, 18.
74
See Rome Statute, supra note 59, pts. 9, 10; DSU, supra note 59, arts. 17, 19, 22; ITLOS, supra
note 59, art. 33.
75
See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 36(9)(a).
76
See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L.
895, 905–20 (2006).
77
See also TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES
AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 167 (2004).

389

36_2_3_DIMITROPOULOS

FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/30/16 3:18 PM

36:371 (2016)

introduction of its own rules.
2. Appearance of Bias and Absolute Limits
Beyond the features of judicial independence that refer to the institutional design of the courts and tribunals, there are also substantive standards
of judicial independence. The very well-known dictum of Lord Chief Justice Hewart that “justice must be done and be seen to be done” is considered the touchstone substantive standard of judicial independence for domestic judges.78 Supported also by Article 6 European Convention of
Human Rights case law, the “appearance of bias” test can be considered the
worldwide standard of judicial independence.79 According to Professors
Shany and Horovitz, the “reasonable appearance of bias” standard as reflected in Principles 9.2 and 12.1 of the non-mandatory Burgh House Principles reflects lex lata since it is practiced both in international and domestic courts.80 As we shall see in the following sections, this is also the
generally applicable standard in international arbitration.
Next to the appearance of bias test, the principles audi alteram partem
and nemo iudex in causa sua pose the absolute limits of functional and organizational independence.81
C. Independence in International Investment Arbitration
After having discussed different aspects of adjudicator independence
in domestic and international dispute resolution systems, this section focuses on the independence guarantees and the applicable standard in investment arbitration. A study of the relevant documents and case law reveals
some striking similarities, so that we are able to speak of a common law of
international arbitration, but also some striking differences between arbitral common law and the ICSID framework, at least on the face of it. This
discussion is preceded by an outlook on the nature of investor-State arbitration as reflected in the most recent discussions of international arbitration
scholars.
1. Between Two Worlds
An important current question in investment law and arbitration con78

R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 356, 259.
See generally Brekoulakis, supra note 5, at 7–8.
80
Shany & Horovitz, supra note 58, at 122. As we also saw in the Mauritius v. United Kingdom
award, it seems that the ICJ Statute in some respects sets the bar to prove the dependence of the judges
higher than other courts and the Burgh House Principles. Compare, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 59, arts.
16, 17(2), with Burgh House Principles, supra note 18, arts. 8–11.
81
See infra Part III.B.
79
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cerns the applicable paradigm.82 The two different paradigms in international investment arbitration supposedly clash. Some scholars view investor-State arbitration as a species of commercial arbitration; others view it as
a dispute settlement mechanism of (traditional) public (international) law.83
The question arises because investor-State arbitration is situated between
two worlds—it departs substantially from traditional public international
law and from commercial arbitration.
International investment arbitration has an undoubtedly “public character.”84 It is usually based on international treaties, which are sources of
public international law. The parties in a dispute are always a statedefendant and an investor-claimant. Disputes also have a public character
since they involve claims by individuals against governments in relation to
the exercise of public power in disputes that could be considered constitutional or administrative in nature. Moreover, disputes are decided at first
and last instance.
On the other side, even treaty-based arbitration has an ad hoc and nonhierarchical character based on case-specific mandates.85 International investment tribunals are not international courts.86 They are modeled largely
on commercial arbitration tribunals, not on court adjudication, and a large
part of the body of arbitrators comes from commercial arbitration. Additionally, they have compulsory jurisdiction against states which is a feature
that many international courts, including the ICJ, do not enjoy.
Accepting one approach to international investment law and arbitration
has consequences for the interpretation of Bilateral Investment Treaties
82

See generally Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013). These paradigms do not refer to the question of the
reasons of the adoption of BITs, including investment arbitration. See Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen,
Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 1 (2014)
(adding the “bounded rational competition model” to the “rational competition,” and the “emulation
model”).
83
See generally Roberts, supra note 82 (with further differentiations); INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 1, 8 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010); GUS VAN
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); Stephan Schill, W(h)ither
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L.
875 (2011); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006) (on the public law paradigm).
84
W. Michael Reisman, ‘Case Specific Mandates’ versus ‘Systemic Implications’: How Should
Investment
Tribunals Decide? The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB. INT’L 131, 138 (2013).
85
Id. at 137.
86
International arbitral tribunals do not meet the standards Cesare Romano uses to define international courts. According to Romano, international judicial bodies are permanent institutions that are:
established by an international legal instrument (usually a treaty); rely on international law so as to resolve cases; follow set rules of procedure; and issue legally binding judgments. Cesare P. R. Romano,
The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 709, 713–14 (1999).
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(BITs), arbitral awards, and also possible proposals for institutional reforms.87 Introducing concepts familiar to other more established fields of
law might help in the development of international investment law and arbitration but could just as easily hinder its development because these concepts are still foreign to this field. For example, one strand of the literature
supporting the public character of investor-State arbitration argues that the
traditional public international law approach is not sufficient to describe its
nature, and proposes understanding investor-State arbitration as a field of
public law in broader terms including public international law, classical
public law, and comparative public law.88 This understanding of investorState arbitration frequently leads to the interpretation of arbitral review as
judicial review in domestic courts. But, the concept of public law is accompanied by further concepts that may be old-fashioned even for the description of domestic legal orders, like hierarchy, command-and-control, and
strict separation of powers. This may hinder the adoption of new principles
and ideas in the field.
The question of the applicable paradigm in international investment
law and arbitration spills over into the understanding of the independence of
investment arbitrators. Stephan Schill, for example, transposes the frame of
separation of powers as the relevant frame for the independence of arbitrators.89 But, arbitrators don’t operate in the same environment as judges. As
we shall see, international arbitration, and investor-State arbitration more
specifically, have their own mechanisms for the promotion of the independence of the arbitrators. Moreover, even domestic systems have moved away
from the traditional understanding of an absolute independence of judges
with the introduction of mechanisms of judicial accountability.90
As we saw in Mauritius v. U.K., international law might even be suggesting lower independence standards for investor-State arbitration than the
common law of international arbitration. As further discussed in Caratube
v. Kazakhstan, international investment arbitration is producing its own understanding of independence. This Article proposes to take an approach that
respects the hybrid nature of international investment law and arbitration.91
International investment tribunals stand in the middle between (internation-

87

See also Roberts, supra note 82, at 46–47; Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International
Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 223, 229 (2013).
88
Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
89
Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard
of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 580 (2012).
90
See, e.g., INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE JUDICIARY passim (Guy Canivet, Mads
Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2006).
91
See generally Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a Complex
Adaptive System, How it Emerged and How it Can be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV. 371 (2014).
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al and domestic) courts and more typical forms of arbitral tribunals.92 The
suggested approach has an effect on both the proposed standard of independence93 and the proposed system of control in international arbitration.94
2. Features of the Common Law of Arbitral Independence
Independence and impartiality of arbitrators is of great importance and
is commonly found in most arbitration rules and laws.95 A study of the provisions of international arbitration documents, relevant case law and literature reveals some common features of independence in international arbitration. In the view of many commentators and arbitral case law, the different
independence standards employed by investment-related fora, such as the
ICSID, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Rules, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), are roughly the same despite slight textual
differences.96 At the same time, the International Bar Associations’ Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (IBA Guidelines)
are increasingly considered to be best practice in arbitration97 and reflecting
the general standard of international arbitrator independence, conflict of interest avoidance, and disclosure. The relevant issues on arbitrator independence can be broken down into a structured discussion of: (a) independence
and impartiality; (b) the different types of provisions that constitute the independence standard; and, eventually, (c) the applicable standard used in
the assessment of arbitrator independence.
92

See also Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 660 (2012)
(saying that investor-State arbitration has both a public and a commercial nature).
93
See infra Part II.C.2 and 3.
94
See infra Part IV.
95
CLYDE CROFT, CHRISTOPHER KEE & JEFF WAINCYMER, A GUIDE TO THE UNICITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES 130 (2013). Croft, Kee and Waincymer even raise arbitral independence to the
status of an international principle. Id.
96
Park, supra note 5, at 670–73. In addition, Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 161, cited to
several arbitral awards—both commercial and investment—including the following ICSID cases: EDF
International S.A., SAUR International S.A. & León Participaciones S.A. v. Republic of Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Challenge Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ¶ 74
(June 25, 2008) (“As explained above, the leading international arbitration rules are broadly similar.
Despite slight textual differences, tribunals have not tended to give them markedly different effect. To
justify the removal of an arbitrator, the petitioner’s doubts must be justifiable on some objective basis,
reasonable by the standard of a fair minded, rational, objective observer.”). See also BernasconiOsterwalder et al., supra note 5, at 5 (“As this note explains, however, notwithstanding the different language used in the arbitration rules, the standards that have emerged for judging arbitrator challenges are
today rather uniform. The textual variations are not the source of the problem.”).
97
Audley Sheppard, Arbitrator Independence In ICSID Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 131, 136
(Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
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(a) Independence and impartiality: The first point of the arbitral common law of independence refers to the distinction between independence
and impartiality. According to Suez et al. v. Argentina “independence relates to the lack of relations with a party that might influence an arbitrator’s
decision. Impartiality, on the other hand, concerns the absence of bias or
predisposition toward one of the parties.”98 The Tribunal reflects a common
perception in international arbitration and in domestic and international case
law and practice. The two notions, commonly collectively referred to as
“bias,”99 are considered to constitute one standard that has to be read into
texts, like that of the ICSID, where both notions are not written down expressis verbis. The ICSID tribunals have consistently followed this approach.100
There are three possible grounds of dependence and partiality of an arbitrator and accordingly three general grounds to challenge an arbitrator that
will not be discussed further here: (i) a personal, professional, or financial
relationship between an arbitrator and a party; (ii) a similar relationship between arbitrator and counsel; and (iii) issue and subject-matter conflicts.101
b. Three types of provisions: Second, the independence standard has to
be distilled from three different types of provisions in the relevant arbitration rules. In all arbitration rules, there are provisions and rules regarding:
(1) the qualifications of arbitrators, which refers to the obligation of independence and impartiality of the arbitrators described in the previous paragraphs;102 (ii) disclosure (and investigation), primarily concerning possible
98

Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on a Second Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, and AWG Group Limited v. Republic of Argentina
(UNCITRAL Arbitration), ¶ 28 (May 12, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0812.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., & Vivendi Universal S.A.
v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification
of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0811_0.pdf; see also Sheppard, supra note 97, at 133 (“The terms ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’ are not synonymous. In broad terms, the former refers to the lack of connection with a particular
party whilst the latter refers to a predisposition or favouritism”).
99
See generally Brekoulakis, supra note 5 (discussing questions of implicit and systemic bias beyond apparent bias of individual adjudicators).
100
See Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶¶ 65–66 (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3028.pdf.
101
Sheppard, supra note 96, at 138 passim; Federica Cristani, Challenge and Disqualification of
Arbitrators in International Investment Arbitration: An Overview, 13 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS &
TRIBUNALS 153, 154 (2014).
102
Qualifications rules: ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 14(a); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. GAOR 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/65/465, art. 11 (Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]; PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, RULES, art. 6(3) (Dec. 17,
2012),
http://www.pcacpa.org/PCA%20Arbitration%20Rules%202012_20130804%20Enga61a.pdf?fil_id=2309 (issued pur-
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conflicts of interest; 103 and (iii) challenge.104 These three different types of
provisions give an overall understanding of the legal framework for the independence of the arbitrator and have to be read as a whole with a view to
the applicable independence standard.
c. The applicable standard: Third, one common test of the independence of international arbitrators seems to prevail across the arbitral fora.
Trying to distil a standard of review for the independence of international
arbitrators, the following pattern of analysis has been identified in the relevant documents, case law and literature:
• Standard: What is the appropriate standard of independence?
• Intensity: What is the intensity of the standard?
• Point of view: Based on the understanding of whom?
Based on this pattern, the test concerning the independence of international arbitrators proposed by the majority of the arbitration community and
relevant scholarship is:
• Standard: “appearance of bias”
• Intensity: mere possibility of bias
• Point of view: “reasonable and informed observer/third party”
(objective)
The usual basis for a review of independence in the arbitral common
law is the appearance of bias test which refers to the reasonable apprehension of bias by the judging authority.105 The appearance of bias is not the
suant to Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 19, 1899, 36 Stat.
2199 and Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199)
[hereinafter PCA ARBITRATION RULES]; INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION
RULES, arts. 11(1), 15(2) (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-andadr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/ [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES]; STOCKHOLM CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE,
ARBITRATION
RULES,
art.
14(1)
(Jan.
1,
2010),
http://sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng_webbversion.pdf
[hereinafter
SCC
ARBITRATION RULES]; LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, RULES, art. 14.1 (2014),
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx [hereinafter LCIA
RULES]; see also IBA Guidelines, supra note 17, General Principle 1; cf. also U.N. COMM. ON INT’L
TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH
AMENDMENTS AS AMENDED IN 2006, arts. 11.5, 12, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006).
103
Disclosure rules: ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 102, art. 6(2); UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, supra note 102, art. 11; PCA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 11; ICC ARBITRATION
Rules, supra note 102, arts. 11(2), (3); SCC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, arts. 14(2), (3); LCIA
RULES, supra note 102, art. 5.3; see also IBA Guidelines, supra note 17, General Standards 3, 7; cf. also
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 12(1). The IBA Guidelines are the only international arbitration document
to deal that extensively with conflicts of interest.
104
Challenge rules: ICSID Convention, supra note 8, arts. 57, 58; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
supra note 102, arts. 12, 13; PCA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 12; ICC ARBITRATION
Rules, supra note 102, art. 14; SCC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 15; LCIA RULES, supra
note 102, art. 10; cf. also UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 12(1).
105
Appearance of bias is different from actual bias. According to Van Harten, actual bias in international investment arbitration is “whether arbitrators individually or as a group are influenced by inappropriate factors in the resolution of legal issues or disputes.” Gus Van Harten, Contributions and Limi-

395

36_2_3_DIMITROPOULOS

FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/30/16 3:18 PM

36:371 (2016)

same as actual bias. The question that has to be asked is whether there are
justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator.
The application of the appearance of bias test by international investment
arbitration tribunals brings international arbitration closer to a judicial process and makes the arbitration process compatible with generally acceptable
independence standards like that of Article 6 of the European Convention of
Human Rights.106
A recent decision referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration Secretary-General Christiaan Kröner—which, in contrast to many previous decisions, was made public—shows how the relevant standard has started to
be applied in international investment law.107 In Perenco v. Ecuador, the
parties had assented to a special Agreement that the Secretary-General of
the PCA would resolve any arbitrator challenges.108 Additionally, for the
first time in an investment case, the parties had agreed that the applicable
law would be the IBA Guidelines.109 The issue arose out of a published interview of the claimants’ arbitrator, Judge Charles Brower. In this interview, Judge Brower made comments about Ecuador and about the pending
ICSID proceedings. The respondents filed the disqualification request based
on these comments. From the outset, the Tribunal made clear what the
standard of review was: “The relevant question in resolving this challenge
under the IBA Guidelines is whether the interview comments constitute circumstances that, ‘from a reasonable third person’s point of view having
knowledge of the relevant facts, give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.’”110 In applying this standard, the
PCA Secretary-General said that the combination of the words chosen by
Judge Brower—especially the word “recalcitrant”—and the context in
which he used the words, would give a reasonable and informed third party
justifiable doubts as to Judge Brower’s impartiality towards Ecuador;111 the
same applied to the further claim on the risk of prejudgment concerning
Judge Brower’s view on whether Ecuador’s actions constitute an expropriatations of Empirical Research on Independence and Impartiality in International Investment Arbitration,
1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, no. 4, 2011, at 1, 5.
106
COTTON, supra note 5, at 1 (citing to British case law).
107
In the Matter of a Challenge to be Decided by The Secretary-General of the Permanent Court Of
Arbitration Pursuant to an Agreement Concluded on October 2, 2008, PCA Case No. IR-2009/1 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2009), appealing by agreement from Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic Of Ecuador & Empresa Estatal Pertoleos Del Ecuador (“Petroecuador”), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision On Challenge To Arbitrator (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/documents/PerencovEcuador-Challenge.pdf
[hereinafter Peru v. Ecuador].
108
See generally Andrea Martignoni, Louise Jenkins & Hop Dang, Focus: ICSID Arbitrator Disqualified For Comments in Media, ALLENS LINKLATERS: ARBITRATION (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/arb/foarb2mar10.htm.
109
Perenco v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. IR-2009/1, ¶ 2.
110
Id. ¶ 4.
111
Id. ¶¶ 48–53.
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tion.112
3. The Peculiarities of the ICSID Framework
A similar pattern of analysis and standard of independence applies also
to ICSID arbitration.113 However, the language of some ICSID Convention
causes some confusion since there seems to be a deviation in several important respects from the common standard and test described above.
(a) The text of the ICSID Convention and beyond
a. Independence and impartiality: With regard to independence and
impartiality, there is no mention of impartiality in the English or French
versions of the ICSID Convention. Nonetheless, “imparcialidad de juicio”
is mentioned in the Spanish version of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention.
This is one of the reasons that ICSID case law, beginning with the Suez et
al. v. Argentina award mentioned earlier, reads the impartiality standard in
the text of the ICSID Convention.114
b. Three types of provisions: The same set of independence and impartiality guarantees that has been identified in other fields of international arbitration can be also traced here. Concerning the qualifications of ICSID
arbitrators, Article 14 of the ICSID Convention provides:
[P]ersons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law,
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise
independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators.115

An additional independence guarantee, which is a peculiarity of ICSID
vis-à-vis many international courts, is the provision on the nationality of ar112

Id. ¶¶ 54–58.
LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION, supra note 5, at 475 (“One of
the things that the members of the relatively small pool of ICSID arbitrators have in common is that they
either used to (or still) serve as arbitrators in strictly private international commercial disputes. They
therefore carry the customs of ICA, which include the ‘justifiable doubts’ (or ‘reasonable apprehension,’
as it is usually read) standard, in their briefcases when they cross over into ISA.”).
114
See, e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S. A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the Committee (Oct. 3 2001), ¶ 14,
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0208.pdf.
115
See also ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, art. 14(2) (“The Chairman, in designating persons to serve on the Panels, shall in addition pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of economic
activity.”); ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 6(2).
113
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bitrators. In contrast, for example to the ICJ, ITLOS and other international
tribunals’ provisions, no arbitrators that have the same nationality as the
parties are allowed on the tribunal.116
The disclosure rule of Article 6(2) ICSID Arbitration Rules does not
present any major differences in comparison to the rules of the other arbitral
fora since it includes the standard arbitrator declaration of independence.
The challenge rule of the ICSID Convention is laid out in Article 57:
A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the disqualification of any of its members on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article 14. A
party to arbitration proceedings may, in addition, propose the disqualification of an arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for
appointment to the Tribunal under Section 2 of Chapter IV.117

Article 57 mentions the need for the existence of “facts,” in contrast to
“appearances” or “circumstances,” indicating a manifest lack, in contrast to
reasonable lack, of the qualities of an arbitrator. Here we see the major difference, at least textually, between the ICSID and the other arbitration rules.
There seems to be in ICSID a higher threshold for a successful challenge
than under alternative regimes.118 The question is whether “manifest” describes how seriously an arbitrator lacks one of the necessary qualities or
whether it describes standard of proof to which the lack must be established.119
In ICSID, a proposal for disqualification by one of the parties shall
take place “promptly,” and in any event, before a proceeding is declared
closed.120 The rules of the other arbitration fora set specific limits, like the
thirty-day rule under the International Chamber of Commerce Rules121 and

116

There is a similar provision in Article 13(5) of the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration rules, which provides that “the sole arbitrator or the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be of a
nationality other than those of the parties.” Nathan, supra note 5, at 19 (“the rationale for the ICSID
Rule and the ICC Rule (to a lesser extent) in regard to nationalities of arbitrators is unclear to me in this
age of mass migrations, involuntary transfers of peoples, and political and economic refugees because
nationality can often be a matter of accident and convenience than choice.”). See generally Ilhyung Lee,
Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of the International Arbitrator, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603
(2008).
117
ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, art. 57 (emphasis added); see also id., art. 58.
118
Crawford, supra note 5, at 1.
119
Id. at 2 (“But even if we accept this second approach, there remains a further question: the meaning of ‘manifest’. Some tribunals have considered the pertinent inquiry to be whether the evidence of
unreliability is manifest, meaning that it is clear. Others have considered the inquiry to be whether the
degree of the unreliability is manifest: here ‘manifest’ means serious.”).
120
ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 8, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings,
Rule 9(1).
121
ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 14(2).
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the IBA Guidelines122 and the fifteen-day rule (counting from the date when
the parties learned of the potential conflict of interest) under the
UNCITRAL123 and SCC124 Rules.
A further peculiarity of the ICSID framework is that independence and
impartiality may constitute a ground for annulment by the ad hoc committees.125 Additionally, in contrast to other arbitral rules126 which provide that
a challenge shall be determined by the appointing authority, the ICSID rules
provide that disqualification proposals are decided by the unchallenged arbitrators, and by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council in the
case of their disagreement.127
The applicable standard: The peculiarities of the ICSID arbitration
framework created problems regarding the applicable test and standard for
the evaluation of the independence of ICSID arbitrators. The language of
Article 57 of the ICSID Convention creates the impression that it establishes a less strict test than the common “appearance of bias” test identified
above.128 According to Luttrell: “The ICSID test for bias is therefore
unique: the inter-operation of Articles 14(1) and 57 produce a rule that an
ICSID arbitrator may only be challenged for bias where he or she manifestly lacks the capacity to exercise independent judgment. As far as I am
aware, no other arbitral institution or law uses this test.”129
(b) The Recent Case Law
As Judge James Crawford rightly observes, there are two lines of case
law in ICSID arbitration.130 One line of case law begins with the first Suez
decision in 2007 and seems to be closer to the letter of the ICSID Conven122

IBA Guidelines, supra note 17, General Standards Regarding Impartiality, Independence and
Disclosure 4(a).
123
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS AMENDED IN 2006, art. 13(1), U.N. Sales No.
E.08.V.4 (2006).
124
SCC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art.15(2).
125
See ICSID, BACKGROUND PAPER ON ANNULMENT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL OF
ICSID 447 (2012). According to Luttrell, “[i]n an ICSID proceeding, the only post-award opportunity to
plead bias is by motion for annulment under Article 52(1)(d).” Luttrell, Bias Challenges in InvestorState Arbitration, supra note 5, at 457. According to Pinsole, at least three of the five grounds of Article
52(1)—(a), (c) and (d)—can be used to raise issues of independence and impartiality of the members of
an arbitral tribunal. Philippe Pinsole, The Challenge of Awards Rendered by Biased Arbitrators – Do
Not Lose Your Rights, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2008).
126
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 102, art. 12.
127
ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 58.
128
See supra Section I.B.2.
129
Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 458; see also CHRISTOPH
H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1201–02 (2d ed. 2009); Sheppard,
supra note 97, at 132.
130
Crawford, supra note 5.
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tion.131This case law is in contrast to the earlier line of case law, first decided by the unchallenged arbitrators of an ad hoc Committee, that follows a
modified appearance of bias test beyond the strict letter of the ICSID Convention—132 which is the common standard for the assessment of independence in international arbitration. Most cases since 2012 have not followed
the Suez approach. Applying the scheme of analysis described above, the
Suez case law is based on the following test:
• Standard of review: manifest lack
• Intensity: high probability of bias based on facts
• Point of view: reasonable observer/third party (objective)
The ICSID independence test based on the separate line of case law
can be simplified as follows:
• Standard of review: appearance of bias
• Intensity: manifest lack of bias (“obvious” or “evident”)
• Point of view: reasonable observer/third party (objective)
In order to distill the current status of interpretation of the ICSID independence standard, the present study presents some data on ICSID disqualification cases, focusing primarily on cases from 2012 to 2014 not previously considered by other authors.133 In the 2012 to 2014 period we observe an
explosion of cases,134 changes on the deciding authorities, and increases in
131

Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on a Second Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, and AWG Group Limited v. Republic of Argentina
(UNCITRAL Arbitration), ¶ 28 (May 12, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0812.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A.
v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification
of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0811_0.pdf; see also Nations Energy Corporation, Electric Machinery Enterprises Inc.
&Jamie Jurado v. The Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19, Challenge to Dr. Stanimir A.
Alexandrov (on the Annulment Committee) (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0561.pdf; ConocoPhillips Company et al. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify L. Yves Fortier Q.C., Arbitrator
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0223.pdf.
132
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. The Republic of Argentina,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the Committee (Oct. 3, 2001),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0208.pdf; Société Générale de Surveillance
S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to
Disqualify Arbitrator (Dec. 19, 2002), 8 ICSID Rep. 398 (2005). This line is followed by most decisions
on disqualification proposals since 2012, including Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP, supra note 25, and RSM
Production Corp. v. Saint Lucia, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal for the Disqualification of Dr. Gavan
Griffith QC, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10 (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw4062.pdf.
133
DAELE, supra note 10.
134
In total there are 15 cases—2 in 2012, 5 in 2013 and 8 in 2014. Cases from ICSID Tribunals in
the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 that are not included in Daele’s study. From 2012:
1. ConocoPhillips Company et al., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30;
2. Getma International et al. v. Republic of Guinea, Décision sur la Demande en Récusation de
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disqualification proposals being upheld.135
Monsieur Bernardo M. Cremades, Arbitre, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/29 (June 28, 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1068.pdf;
From 2013:
3. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on
Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Gabriel Bottini, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/13 (Feb. 27,
2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1311.pdf;
4. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5
(not published, reported June 14, 2013);
5. Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, ICSID Case No.
ARB 12/20 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw3009.pdf;
6. Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5 (formerly Burlington
Resources Inc. & others v. Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador
(PetroEcuador)) (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0106.pdf;
7. Repsol, S.A. & Repsol Butano, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, Decisión Sobre la Propuesta de
Recusación a la Mayoría del Tribunal [Decision on the Disqualification Proposal of the Majority of the Tribunal], ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38 (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3033.pdf.
From 2014:
8. Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/2,
Resignation
of
Professor
Philippe
Sands
(Jan.
10,
2014),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3045.pdf;
9. Abaclat & Others v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority
of the Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly Giovanna a Beccara & Others v. The
Argentine Republic) (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw3057.pdf;
10.Koch Minerals Sàrl & Koch Nitrogen International Sàrl v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on Respondent’s Challenge to Judge Florentino Feliciano, ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/19 (not published, reported Feb. 24, 2014);
11.Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, Decision
on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13 (Mar.
20, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf;
12.ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. & ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria
B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify a Majority
of the Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30 (May 5, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3162.pdf.pdf;
13.Transban Investments Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/24
(not published, reported May 13, 2014);
14.İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify
Professor Philippe Sands, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24 (July 11, 2014),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3260.pdf;
15.RSM Production Corporation v. Saint Lucia, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal for the Disqualification of Dr. Gavan Griffith QC, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/10 (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4062.pdf.
135
Moreover, there is at least one reported UNCITRAL disqualification award that upholds a disqualification challenge during 2013–2014, namely CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited & Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Deci-
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There have been fifty disqualification cases in ICSID since 1982,136
fourteen of which occurred during the studied period from the end of 2012
until 2014. This accounts for 28% of the cases. These cases concern a total
of sixty-eight arbitrators; twenty-two arbitrators, i.e., more than 32%, were
challenged during this period. The interesting shift in the discussed period
takes place with regard to the deciding authority. From the three deciding
authorities of the ICSID framework, the unchallenged arbitrators have decided in the final instance twenty-four cases in total, of which six occurred
from late 2012 until the end of 2014. During these years, the Chairman of
the ICSID Administrative Council decided the majority of cases, constituting nine of the fourteen cases he has decided since 1982.137 Moreover, there
have been eleven resignations in the history of ICSID arbitration, with two
arbitrators resigning between 2013 and 2014.
Figure 1 presents the described results, based on data gathered by Karel Daele until 2012138 and data gathered by the author from late 2012
through 2014:

sion on the Respondent’s Challenge to the Hon. Marc Lalonde as Presiding Arbitrator and Prof. Francisco Orrego Vicuna as Co-Arbitrator, PCA Case No. 2013-09 (Sept. 30, 2013) (sustaining the challenge
brought against the arbitrator appointed by the claimant, Francisco Orrego Vicuña, and dismissing the
challenge of the Chairperson, Marc Lalonde); the decision in the case was taken by the President of the
ICJ, Judge Peter Tomka.
136
The first one was in the case Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case ARB/81/1,
Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator (not published, reported June 24, 1982).
137
The remaining members of the ad hoc Committee have rendered two decisions in total, none of
which occurred in the last two years.
138
DAELE, supra note 10, 455.
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FIGURE 1: ICSID DISQUALIFICATION CASES

A constant decisional pattern can be observed until 2012. The unchallenged arbitrators decided disqualification challenges against twenty-two
arbitrators. They rejected the claims for eighteen arbitrators, whereas they
disqualified no fellow arbitrator. The cases against four arbitrators were
equally decided and then sent to the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative
Council. The Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council has dismissed
nine disqualification motions, whereas he disqualified one arbitrator.
This pattern changes in the studied period. Respondents challenged fifteen times and claimants challenged seven times. Chairpersons have been
challenged four times, whereas three arbitrators in total were disqualified.
The high rate of challenges by the claimants is a recent development. It was
originally hypothesized in international investment arbitration that respondents would have the tendency to challenge an arbitrator for the purpose of
delaying the proceeding and final award, but claimants would have the general tendency to try and avoid challenges to reduce costs and increase the
speed of arriving to a result.139 The recent developments have also put this
139

See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 506. It is not common for parties to challenge the arbitrator that
they have appointed; there are at least two exceptions prior to 2012: Tanzania Electric Supply Co. Ltd.
v. Independent Power Tanzania Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8 (July 20, 2001); Walter Bau AG (In
Liquidation) v. The Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award (July 1, 2009), ¶¶ 1.36–1.42,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:iic/429-2009.case.1/IIC429(2009)D.pdf. In both cases, the
arbitrators resigned voluntarily after the challenge. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 510 n.42. The Chairman
of ICSID Administrative Council rejected recently a challenge by Venezuela against its party-appointed

403

36_2_3_DIMITROPOULOS

FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

3/30/16 3:18 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

36:371 (2016)

assumption to test.
TABLE 1: DISQUALIFICATION PROPOSALS 2012–2014
Respondent
Claimant
Total

v. Chairperson
4
0
4

v. C-Arbitrator
10
0
10

v. R-Arbitrator
1
7
8

Total
15
7

Table 1 shows the disqualification proposals filed in the studied period
late 2012–2014 by respondents and claimants. “v. Chairperson” indicates
that the proposal has been filed against the Chairperson of a Tribunal. “v.
C-Arbitrator” indicates that the proposal has been filed against the arbitrator
appointed by the claimant; “v. R-arbitrator” indicates that the proposal has
been filed against the arbitrator appointed by the respondent
Except for the two resignations during 2013–2014, the unchallenged
arbitrators have decided far fewer cases than in the past. Given that the arbitrators are members of the same community, it has recently become very
difficult for members of the same panel to decide the cases against their fellow arbitrators. Five out of six challenges decided by the co-arbitrators
were rejected and three equally decided. But, very importantly the two remaining co-arbitrators of the Caratube Tribunal upheld—for the first time
in the history of international investment arbitration—the disqualification of
a third arbitrator.140 In Caratube, the unchallenged arbitrators disqualified
the arbitrator of the respondent state since he was sitting in different but
similar cases and might have acquired knowledge of facts of the case.141
It seems improbable that this result would have been achieved without
the previous decisions of the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council. Recent cases verify the trend in ICSID towards outsourcing the decisions to disqualify to neutral institutions like the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID, i.e., the President of the World Bank, from whom
a case may be further referred to other deciding authorities. A case may be
referred to a different deciding authority than the remaining arbitrators either if the parties agree or if the unchallenged arbitrators could not reach a
commonly agreed decision.142 Even though not legally obliged, when the
arbitrator in Koch v. Venezuela, supra note 131.
140
See Chiara Giorgetti, Caratube v. Kazakhstan: For the First Time Two ICSID Arbitrators Uphold
Disqualification of Third Arbitrator, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/22/caratube-v-kazakhstan-first-time-two-icsid-arbitratorsuphold (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
141
Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch (Mar. 20,
2014), ¶¶ 71–91, 109–10, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3133.pdf.
142
See ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 58. From the sample in late 2012–2014, the unchal-
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Chairman does not consider it appropriate to make the decision on his own
or just to seek recommendation by the ICSID Secretary General,143 he will
usually refer the issue to the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, beyond the text of the ICSID Convention.144 The Chairman of
the Administrative Council of ICSID, Jim Yong Kim, decided the majority
of the fourteen disqualification proposals in the relevant period. The Chairman dismissed twelve challenges and upheld two.145
As a result of the efforts of the arbitration community to establish a
high substantive standard of independence in its interface with other actors
involved in international investment arbitration, an independence and impartiality standard for international investment arbitrators coalesced in the
case law over the last two years. According to the new rule from Caratube
v. Kazakhstan, the claimants must show that a third party would find that
there is an evident or obvious appearance of lack of impartiality or independence based on a reasonable evaluation of the facts of the case.146 This
is a new standard beyond Articles 57 and 14 ICSID Convention, but also
beyond appearance of bias as applied in the other fora. The tribunals have
rejected the need to prove an actual dependence or bias of the arbitrators,
but at the same time, and in contrast to the common appearance of bias test,
they have set a higher burden of proof in that the appearances have to be
manifest, i.e., evident, or obvious.147
As we shall see in the following section, this approach is an aspect of
the constructed development of international investment law and arbitration. The whole field is being constructed through a process of communication within the arbitration community that applies the relevant law with the
other actors that are involved in the field.
III. CONSTRUCTING AN INDEPENDENCE STANDARD FOR
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
International courts and arbitral tribunals have a different design. What
is the difference between the safeguards of international courts and the
lenged arbitrators could not reach a commonly agreed decision in Getma v. Guinea, Burlington v. Ecuador, and Koch v. Venezuela.
143
DAELE, supra note 10, at 176.
144
See Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 162; DAELE, supra note 10, at 176.
145
In one case, the proposal to disqualify was rejected based on the condition that the arbitrator, Mr.
Bottini, completes, signs, and transmits to the ICSID Secretary-General a new Declaration under Rule 6
of ICSID Arbitration Rules. See Saint-Gobain v. Venezuela, supra note 131.
146
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on
Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Gabriel Bottini, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/13 (Feb. 27, 2013),
¶ 57, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1311.pdf.
147
Also according to Schreuer, the term “manifest” in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention imposes
“a relatively heavy burden on the party making the proposal.” See SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 129, at
1202 .
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safeguards of international arbitral tribunals? In order to understand this
question better, the distinction between organizational and functional guarantees that was drawn in Part II.B.1 is useful. This analysis showed that in
comparison to other international adjudication bodies, ICSID and other investment tribunals are constituted under lower formal guarantees of independence than international courts. International courts are standing courts
with (a majority of) permanent judges. The arbitral tribunals are not standing and are composed of individuals with different backgrounds that compete for the same positions on a global arbitrators market.148
Within the arbitral tribunals, there are largely the same personal guarantees of independence. Typical functional guarantees are qualifications of
the adjudicators, challenge rules, and rules on disclosure (and investigation), primarily concerning possible conflicts of interest.149 On the other
side, there are no organizational safeguards of independence in the arbitration tribunals.150 This is probably why the ICSID Convention focuses on independent decision making and not generically on independence: Article
14(1) (and Article 40) of the ICSID Convention speaks about “independent
judgment” of the persons designated to serve on the Panels and not about
the independence of the arbitral tribunal. The focus is thus on the functional, rather than organizational, guarantees of arbitrators’ independence.
But, the differentiation between organizational and functional guarantees of judicial independence, while uncommon in arbitration tribunals, is
not unique to international investment arbitration. In international law, there
is not a single model for the “international judge.”151 As will be explained
in this section, party-appointment is a feature of the design of adjudication
fora that is largely shared by international courts and international arbitral
tribunals.152 The only difference between the two types of dispute resolution
fora is the number of the party-appointed adjudicators. The party-appointed
adjudicators bring their specific knowledge of the case, the facts, and in148

See also Anja Seibert-Fohr, International Judicial Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 757, 761–62 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds.,
2014) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930)); Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 179.
149
Repeating what has been presented in previous Sections, the provisions comparable to Article 14
of the ICSID Convention are: Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 40(1); DSU, supra note 59, art. 8(2);
ITLOS Statute, supra note 59, art. 2(1); ICJ Statute, supra note 59, art. 2.
150
Cf. also Van Harten, supra note 105, at 3–4; Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration 9 (Osgoode Hall Law Sch.
Comp. Res. in Law & Pol. Econ., Research Paper No. 41, 2012) (citing Frank B. Cross & Dain C. Donelson, Creating Quality Courts, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 490, 498 (2010) and Rogers, supra note
22, at 56–57).
151
See Erik Voeten, International Judicial Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 550, 560 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany eds.,
2014).
152
See, e.g., the judges ad hoc of Article 31(2) of the ICJ Statute.
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deed the overall situation of the party into the dispute resolution process
and are an invaluable feature of international law. The right to an independent adjudicator is accompanied in international law by the right to a “casesensitive adjudicator.”153
Overall, only some of the judicial independence variables that were
presented above are applicable to arbitral tribunals. Still, international investment tribunals apply the same substantive standard of independence as
domestic and international courts. This section deals with the question of
how this result has been achieved in the absence of organizational rules of
independence. As we shall see, this is largely the result of an interplay between the rules established by the arbitration community, their de facto influence, and their institutionalization.
A. Interplay Between Legal and Societal Rules: A Race to the Top
1. The Ethics of Independence and the International Arbitration
Community
According to Professors Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, there is an
important convergence among the individuals in the system of international
business transactions and commercial arbitration that refers to the identity
of the key players, the definition of international commercial arbitration,
and how it has changed in the past.154 The development of the high standard
of arbitral independence can be understood as a transition from old to new
forms of international arbitration.155 Dezalay and Garth describe the changes in international commercial arbitration as a conflict between two generations of arbitrators: “grand old men” versus “technocrats.”156 Their conflict
and “symbolic battle” is complemented by that between academics and
practitioners in the field.157 The shift from one generation to the other also
signifies a shift from “relatively informal arbitration” into “offshore litigation.”158 According to Dezalay and Garth, the practice of international arbi153

See also Voeten, supra note 151, at 554 (“Still, the home-state bias is manageable and may be
outweighed by the benefits of expertise and languages abilities such judges bring to the table. How this
trade-off works out depends on the institutional insulation of judges and the context of each court.”).
154
Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 27,
33 (1995).
155
See DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 3–30 (describing the evolution of
the international arbitration community); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryan Garth, Dealing in Virtue, in
CONDUCTING LAW AND SOCIAL RESEARCH: REFLECTIONS ON METHODS AND PRACTICES 200 (Simon
Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2009); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation Of The International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957 (2005).
156
DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 34–41.
157
Id. at 41–42.
158
Id. at 54–57.
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tration is based on the characteristics of the generation of arbitrators that
dominated arbitration during this period159 with consequences for the applicable independence standard.160
Arbitration was the dispute resolution mechanism of the medieval Law
Merchant of traders (lex mercatoria). In medieval times, arbitrators were
not expected to be independent or impartial.161 During the late 19th and early 20th century, arbitration was inherited as a practice by the European
higher classes. These grand, old men were primarily senior European professors imbued with the traditional values of the European legal elites. They
considered that arbitration could not be regarded as a profession. In the late
1970s, there was a change in the persons who acted as arbitrators and, consequently, in the nature of the practice.162 Increased competition among arbitrators led to the professionalization of arbitration. These trends have also
led to an increasing emphasis on independence and impartiality.
The change of persons was coupled with some institutional changes.
The partial change in the persons of arbitrators was first accompanied by
the appearance and gradual increase in arbitration houses. The arbitral institutions and their dispute resolution fora have a long history beginning at the
end of the 19th century. For example, the London Court of International
Arbitration (under its previous name) was created in 1892,163 the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration in 1923,164 and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in 1917.165 The
International Chamber of Commerce Rules of 1923 and 1955 contained no
mention of either independence or impartiality, nor did they contain provisions for the challenge of an arbitrator. The multiplication and diversification of places and institutions for arbitrations led to further competition.166
The arbitral institutions adapted to increased competition by introducing independence and impartiality into the arbitral rules. In 1975, the requirement
that “every arbitrator must be and remain ‘independent’ of ‘the parties involved in the arbitration’” was added to Article 7(1) of the International
Chamber of Commerce Rules.167 In 2012, the International Chamber of
159

Id. at 34.
Id. at 48–51.
161
Alec Stone Sweet, Islands of Transnational Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS AND
JUDICIALIZATION 323, 330 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002).
162
DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 39–40.
163
History, LONDON CT. INT’L ARB., http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/history.aspx (last visited Jan. 30,
2015).
164
The Merchants of Peace, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/abouticc/history/the-merchants-of-peace/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
165
About the SCC, ARB. INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.sccinstitute.com/about-the-scc/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
166
DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 44.
167
YVES DERAINS & ERIC A SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 117 (2d ed.
2005).
160
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Commerce again changed its rules to include both independence and impartiality in Articles 11 and 14(1) of its Rules.168
A further institutional variable in this development is the entrance into
the market, predominantly in the late 1970s, of the more commercial Anglo-American law firms with their adversarial style of litigation.169 This
change had a great effect on the understanding of the independence of international arbitrators. The right to an independent and impartial judge is a
basic principle of due process in common law, and U.S. litigators are very
well-trained in raising it.170 The European Convention of Human Rights of
1950 must have also had a similar influence on European lawyers.
In a continuous race to the top, the most complete manifestation of the
willingness of the arbitration community to be and appear to be independent
are the International Bar Association’s “Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest
in International Arbitration,”171 which are practically identical on the issues
of functional independence and impartiality to the statutes of international
courts and “The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary.”172
2. Arbitration Between Sovereigns and Migration to Investment
Arbitration
The history of the development of international commercial arbitration
and the international arbitration community is just the one side of the story
of achieving the personal independence of international investment arbitrators since there have always been two types of international arbitration.
Apart from commercial arbitration between private parties, international arbitration has always existed as a mechanism to resolve disputes between
sovereigns.173 The Jay Treaty of 1794 can be considered as establishing
modern arbitration between sovereigns.174
168

Richard Power, Briefing Note on ICC Rule Changes, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 6,
2011) http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/10/06/briefing-note-on-icc-rule-changes/.
169
DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 54–57.
170
See Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 445.
171
INT’L BAR ASS’N, supra note 17.
172
Burgh House Principles, supra note 18.
173
See Brown, supra note 58, at 66–86; see generally David W. Rivkin, The Impact of International
Arbitration on the Rule of Law – The 2012 Clayton Utz/University of Sydney International Arbitration
Lecture, 29 ARB. INT’L 327 (2013).
174
Rivkin, supra note 173, at 334–36; see also Christine Grey & Benedict Kingsbury, Inter-State
Arbitration Since 1945: Overview and Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 55, 57 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992); Posner & Yoo, supra note 57, at 30–33 (using data from
A.M. STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, 1794–1989 (3d ed. 1990) on arbitration between sovereigns). According to Posner and Yoo, the pattern that emerges from the study of the data of
the period from 1794 (when the Jay Treaty was signed) until 1970 (when international courts started
proliferating) shows that large countries and Latin American countries used arbitration more frequently.
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Adapted to the needs of the international legal order of the time, this
type of public international arbitration had a more diplomatic and political
than judicial nature.175 Just like commercial arbitration, neither the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 that established the Permanent Court of Arbitration nor the Convention of 1907 contained express
provisions on independence or impartiality. Article 23 of the 1899 Treaty
simply introduced the list system that was inherited by the ICSID Convention and included a provision similar to the requirements provisions that are
included in current treaties and arbitration rules.176
The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes of 1966 brings the two traditions of international arbitration together.177 The same applies to the independence guarantee. Drawing inspiration
from provisions in the World Court statute,178 the introduction of a standard
of independence in Articles 14 and 57 ICSID Convention was a step towards recognizing independent arbitration internationally. At the same
time, the contracting states went about independence in a very modest way.
As explained above, they only refer to independence as opposed to “independence and impartiality,” which is the usual standard of judicial independence.179 Additionally, the text of Article 57 of the ICSID Convention
does not provide for the appearance of bias test, but only for the “manifest
lack” test.
A sociological analysis of international investment arbitration helps us
reconsider the independence standard,180 and better understand why the appearance of bias test has been established in the frame of international investment arbitration including ICSID tribunals beyond the text of Article
57. The ICSID Convention is an international treaty established by states.
Yet, it is not the states that apply the treaty, but the international arbitration
“Commissions” were usually used for civil insurrections, war damages, and personal claims, while
“Heads of State” usually decided on arbitrary acts and maritime seizures. Id. at 32.
175
Brown, supra note 58, at 65.
176
In accordance with Article 3 ICSID Convention, ICSID maintains a list of arbitrators consisting
of two parts: Part I consists of designations by the Chairman of the Administrative Council of ICSID
according to Article 13(2) ICSID Convention), and Part II consisting of designations by Contracting
States according to Article 13(1) ICSID Convention. The list is not closed and the Convention parties
are free to appoint arbitrators from outside the list.
177
See generally ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012).
178
The independence standards of all international courts and tribunals, including the ICSID provisions, are largely based on the example of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the ICJ; see
Oellers-Frahm, supra note 51, at 7; see also Brown, supra note 58, at 66–86
179
See supra Section I.B.
180
Cf. also Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Investment Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 143 (Zachary Douglas et al.
eds., 2014); Moshe Hirsch, The Interaction between International Investment Law and Human Rights
Treaties: A Sociological Perspective, in MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
211 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011); see also Reisman, supra note 84 (discussing international investment arbitration as a “system”).
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community. Table 2 presents the nationalities of arbitrators based on a dataset on international investment arbitration gathered by Professor Alec
Stone Sweet et al. including data until December 31, 2013.181 It shows that
Western Europeans, especially Swiss and French arbitrators, dominate the
field of international investment arbitration, followed by U.S. Americans.182
TABLE 2: ARBITRATOR NATIONALITY

ICSID
Arbitrators
Cases
Chaired

Total

Western
Europeans

Swiss

French

U.S.
Americans

272

118

15

30

47

249

128

30

25

15

It is largely the same community of people that deals with international investment cases in the international investment fora as in commercial
arbitration. First, the international arbitration community evolves over the
years in the frame of international commercial arbitration. Then, it migrates
to investment arbitration. The individuals of this community have transposed their ethos and professional practices onto the investment law regime
and arbitration.183 The international arbitration community in the search for
legitimacy and maximization of profits applies the higher standard of arbitral independence also to international investment arbitration,184 despite the
lack of international rules on organizational independence of arbitrators and
beyond the text of Article 14.185
181

Dataset on file with the author.
Arbitrators with dual citizenship are double-counted.
183
See also Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 475 (“One of the
things that the members of the relatively small pool of ICSID arbitrators have in common is that they
either used to (or still) serve as arbitrators in strictly private international commercial disputes. They
therefore carry the customs of ICA, which include the ‘justifiable doubts’ (or ‘reasonable apprehension’,
as it is usually read) standard, in their briefcases when they cross over into ISA.”).
184
See also Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 13, 16 (1997) (exploring the
connection between independence and impartiality, on the one side, and legitimacy in arbitration, on the
other).
185
See Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Order Concerning the
Participation of a Counsel, ¶ 30 (May 6, 2008), which is very typical also concerning the standard of
Article 14, but with the note that the case refers to the challenge of counsel:
The Tribunal [was] concerned – indeed, compelled – to preserve the integrity of the proceedings and ultimately, its Award. Undoubtedly, one of the ‘fundamental rules of procedure’ referred to in Article 52 (1) (d) of the ICSID Convention is that the proceedings should not be
tainted by any justifiable doubt as to the impartiality or independence of any Tribunal member. The Parties agree that the relevant perspective in that inquiry is that of a reasonable independent observer. . .[The challenged counsel’s] continued participation in the proceedings
could indeed lead a reasonable observer to form such a justifiable doubt in the present circumstance.
182
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Arbitral independence in international investment arbitration is only
partially a result of legal rules. It is rather more the effect of the process of
the formation of the community of international arbitrators and its migration to international investment arbitration.186 Arbitral independence in investment law is a societal construct.
Additionally, in the volatile and uncertain world of international
law,187 international courts have had a hard time adapting to the changes of
a globalized world. The more flexible nature of international arbitration tribunals is probably one of the reasons that international investment arbitration has been so successful in recent years, especially in the late 1990s.188
International investment tribunals operate as functional equivalents to
courts in international law. For this reason, and under the guidance of the
arbitration community, investor-State tribunals had to operate under similar
independence standards as international courts, in order to achieve a high
standard of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.189
In the field of investment law, the construction of the independence
standard for arbitrators is the result of a “process of communication”190 and
interaction between the members of the international arbitration community, states, international organizations, arbitration houses, and international
courts. This makes it extremely volatile and subject to changes depending
on the stage of development of the communication process. We have cur-

Id.

186

Cf. Antonin Cohen & Antoine Vauchez, The Social Construction of Law: The European Court of
Justice and Its Legal Revolution Revisited, 7 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 417 (2011) (concerning the societal evolution of the European Union legal order, and the role of the Court of Justice of the EU). This
goes back to an understanding of international law as (also) a process and not (only) as a condition; see
Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (1959). See generally CARLO FOCARELLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (2012) (re-interpreting international law as a socially constructed field).
187
Reisman, supra note 3, at 87–94.
188
See ICSID, supra note 9.
189
But see James Crawford & Joe McIntyre, The Independence and Impartiality of the “International Judiciary,” in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 189, 203 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012). According to
James Crawford—one of the actors involved in the Mauritius v. United Kingdom—and Joe McIntyre:
There are no doubt analogous considerations concerning the exercise of an arbitral function,
but there are also core differences in function. The increased role of party consent and the
discrete and largely private character of the proceedings fundamentally affect not only the
applicable standards, but the underlying objectives as well, particularly with regards to the
diminished importance of public confidence. The judicial function imposes stricter considerations of independence and impartiality than is demanded of arbitral functions.
Id.
190
See Reisman, supra note 14. According to Reisman the legal process comprises three communicative streams: policy content, authority signal, control intention. Id. at 113. See also McDougal &
Lasswell, supra note 186, at 9 (defining legal process as the “making of authoritative and controlling
decisions”).
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rently reached a stage where a higher standard of review is starting to crystallize in international investment arbitration, including ICSID arbitration.
The next subsection describes the standard of review in ICSID arbitration
and makes a proposal for a further differentiation in the standard of review
in order to compromise current adjudication practice of the arbitration
community with the textual interpretation of Article 57.
B. The Independence Standard(s) of International Investment
Arbitrators: Status and Policy
How many standards of review are there in investor-State arbitration?
The provisional answer is that there are at least three: there is one in all arbitration fora and two in the ICSID framework. Through the interplay of the
arbitration community with other actors of the international community that
are involved in the field, a unique ICSID standard has been constructed. In
the following paragraphs, I will clarify some open issues on the standard of
independence in international investment arbitration and propose some corrections from a policy perspective: first, with regard to the chairpersons
given their method of appointment and their special position in the arbitration process; second, concerning the recurring issue of the standard of review in inter-State arbitration; and third, with regard to the “person” of the
reasonable observer in investment arbitration.
Arbitrators are only part-time adjudicators and part of their full-time
job may be to write academic articles and notes on arbitration.191 Moreover,
the interconnectedness of arbitrators, counsel, and businesspeople is unavoidable in a globalized world.192 According to one arbitrator, “if arbitrators
must be completely sanitized from all possible external influences on their
decisions, only the most naïve or incompetent would be available.”193
In contrast to domestic and in most cases also international courts, and
similar to international commercial arbitration, the appointment process is
what appears to be making the difference in international investment arbitration and creating confusion with regard to the standard of independence
191

Urbaser S.A. & Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Professor Campbell MacLachlan, ¶ 46 (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0887.pdf (“[T]he mere fact of having made known an opinion on an issue relevant in an
arbitration would have the effect of allowing a challenge for lack of independence or impartiality. Such
a position, however, would have effects reaching far beyond what Claimants seem to sustain, and incompatible with the proper functioning of the arbitral system under the ICSID Convention.”).
192
Ahmed S. El-Kosheri & Karim Y. Youssef, The Independence of International Arbitrators: An
Arbitrator’s Perspective, ICC INTL. COURT OF ARB. BULL., 2007 Special Supplement, ICC Pub. 690
(2008), 48; see also Nathan, supra note 5, at 18 (“Although arbitral institutions make a fuss about the
relationships with the parties, in practice none of them actually seriously review their relationships and
take appropriate action except on a selective basis.”).
193
Park, supra note 5, at 635.
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of investor-State arbitrators both in relevant case law and scholarship.194
The coexistence of provisions for the independence and the appointment of
arbitrators indeed creates an inherent tension in the provisions of the ICSID,
and indeed any arbitration statute.
In order to resolve the tension, we need to distinguish between appointment by the parties to the dispute, on the one side, and appointment by
other agents, or appointment by consent of the parties or fellow arbitrators,
on the other side. The fact that arbitrators are appointed either by the parties, or by “appointing authorities” and consent, raises different questions
concerning their independence.195 A noted arbitration scholar, Professor
Catherine Rogers, for example, believes that according to the current system of international investment arbitration, the party-appointed and the nonparty-appointed arbitrators are supposed to be different.196 Professor Yuval
Shany contends that for party-appointed judges and arbitrators a consensually agreed deviation from the normal standard of judicial independence applies since the parties exchange expertise and influence for independence
and impartiality in order to resort more often to adjudication.197
This distinction between party-appointed and non-party-appointed arbitrators places a great burden on the chairperson. In investor-State arbitration, the chairperson has an elevated role. This can be deduced from three
types of special provisions. First, from the specific way in which they are
appointed, namely by consent of the parties, the party-appointed arbitrators’
194

Similar questions arise also in the ICJ with the “part-time,” and in other international courts with
ad hoc, part-time, and ad litem judges. Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 278 (2003) (“It would
be unreasonable to expect that a nominating or appointing state would not put forward as a candidate a
person who shares (in general terms) the value systems of the nominating state.”); id. at 283 (“Part-time
and ad litem judges clearly cannot be subject to the same constraints on outside activities as full-time
judges, which raises questions as to which activities are appropriate.”); see generally Yuval Shany,
Squaring the Circle? Independence and Impartiality of Party-Appointed Adjudicators in International
Legal Proceedings, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 473 (2008) (arguing that it is a mistake to apply the same test for judicial independence and impartiality that applies to permanent domestic and international judges, and non-party-appointed arbitrators to party-appointed judges and arbitrators); but
see the Preamble of the Burgh House Principles, supra note 18; Shany & Horovitz, supra note 58, at 120
(criticizing as anachronistic the provisions dealing with the appointment of judges bearing the nationality of litigant states, with particular deference to Article 31 of the ICJ Statute and Article 27(2) of the
ECHR statute).
195
Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al., supra note 5, at 1; cf. also Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 403 (2009) (“The precise institutional mechanisms
that govern the appointment and retention process greatly influence the ability of governments to affect
judicial behavior.”).
196
Rogers, supra note 87, at 246 (“They [party-appointed arbitrators] represent one party’s preference for a decision-maker and are selected based on a careful assessment. If party-appointed arbitrators
were, with any degree of regularity, writing dissenting opinions in favor of an opposing party, it would
mean that parties were doing an exceptionally poor job of identifying party-appointed arbitrators.”) (internal citations omitted).
197
Shany, supra note 194, passim.
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consent, or by a neutral organization. Second, the chairperson’s elevated
role is reflected in different provisions concerning the nationality of arbitrators. In investment arbitration, Article 9(5) International Chamber of Commerce Rules, which specifies the special requirement that the sole arbitrator
or the chairperson of the arbitral tribunal shall be of a nationality other than
those of the parties, has a special role given that states and foreign nationals
are involved in the dispute. Third, the special position of the chairpersons
can also be deduced directly from the special powers they have in the arbitration process.198 For example, pursuant to Article 58 of the ICSID Convention, in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole arbitrator, or a majority of arbitrators, the chairperson shall take this decision.199
For these reasons, the common independence standard should apply to
chairpersons independent of the arbitration forum. I propose that for all the
arbitral fora the common standard should apply. Based on what has been
described above, I then propose two standards for international investment
arbitrators operating under the ICSID framework: one for the chairperson,
and one for the party-appointed arbitrators. For the chairperson of the arbitral tribunal, the common test that applies across investment arbitration, and
arbitration generally, should apply:
• Standard: “justifiable doubts” – “appearance of bias”
• Intensity: mere possibility of bias
• Point of view: “reasonable observer/third party” (objective)
For the party-appointed arbitrators, the test as developed by recent
ICSID case law should apply:
• Standard: “justifiable doubts” – “appearance of bias”
• Intensity: “manifest lack” of bias (high probability of bias)200
• Point of view: “reasonable observer/third party” (objective)
In order to illustrate the differences, the non-corrected ICSID standard
198

See, e.g., PCA ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 102, art. 33(2) (“In the case of questions of procedure, when there is no majority or when the arbitral tribunal so authorizes, the presiding arbitrator may
decide alone, subject to revision, if any, by the arbitral tribunal.”).
199
See also ICSID Regulations and Rules, supra note 8, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 9(4); Piero Bernardini, ICSID versus non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in LIBER
AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 159 (David Arias & Miguel Ángel Fernández-Ballesteros eds.,
2010).
200
The intensity standard of “high probability” of dependence and partiality is to be deduced from a
systematic interpretation of the highly raised bar of the burden of proof as set out in Articles 14 and 57
and from ICSID case law. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. &Vivendi Universal
S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification
of
a
Member
of
the
Arbitral
Tribunal,
¶ 29
(Oct.
22,
2007),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0811_0.pdf (citing Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator (unpublished,
reported June 24, 1982); Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Arbitrator (Dec. 19, 2002), 8
ICSID Rep. 398 (2005)).
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for both the chairperson and the party-appointed arbitrators would have
been the following:
• Standard: “manifest lack”
• Intensity: high probability of bias based on facts
• Point of view: unclear, but probably “reasonable observer/third
party” (objective)
At the same time, accepting a lower standard of independence for party-appointed arbitrators might create perverse incentives for them, and give
the wrong signals to the parties as to the level of their independence. How is
this problem to be solved? From a policy-perspective, the need to respect
the decisions of the parties and the need to provide for justice in international arbitration can be resolved with recourse to the standard of review.
As a basis for the assessment, the deciding authorities could use the relevant
case law concerning the self-judging clauses.201 The International Court of
Justice, the World Trade Organization Appellate Body, and some investment tribunals apply a separate standard of review with regard to the selfjudging exception clauses. They apply a good faith review, instead of a full
substantive review of whether a measure meets the requirements of an exception clause. One could apply this solution to the assessment of arbitral
independence. The difference between the two standards is one of the burden of proof on the side of the challenging party202 and of the disqualification standard of review on the decision of the deciding authority. The challenging party has to pass a higher bar in order to prove dependence or
partiality of the party-appointed arbitrator, in comparison to the chairperson
of the tribunal; the deciding authority, either the unchallenged arbitrators or
the Chairperson of the Administrative Council of ICSID, should apply a
good faith review in the case of the party-appointed arbitrators rather than a
full substantive review in the case of the chairperson.
The question of differentiated standards of review exists both in domestic and international law. The standard of review determines how far an
authority can go in reconsidering another authority’s decision. In the United
States, for example, a standard of review is usually the measure of deference an appellate court gives to the rulings of a lower court.203 Very common standards of review are “clear error,” which is used when the appellate
court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact, “de novo review,” used when
reviewing questions of law, and “abuse of discretion,” used when reviewing
decisions that are left to the discretion of trial courts.204 The intensity of re201

See generally Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, “If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in
International Dispute Settlement, in 13 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 61 (Armin
von Bogdandy & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2009).
202
See Part II.C.3.b. and cases cited supra note 200.
203
See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of American-Style Judicial Review, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010).
204
Id.
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view can be understood as a continuum with clear error at the one end of
the spectrum and de novo review at the other. Clear error is highly deferential, and abuse of discretion is deferential, while de novo review is nondeferential. In international law, different standards of review appear in how
far international courts and tribunals can go when reconsidering a domestic
authority’s decision.205 Also in international economic law, and international investment law more specifically, the standard of review plays an extremely important role as to the degree of deference on the side of the investment tribunals towards decisions of domestic authorities, and the
regulatory discretion of domestic authorities.206 Similarly, the need to respect the decisions of the parties that have selected the specific composition
of an arbitral tribunal and the need to provide for justice in international investment arbitration can be addressed by the standard of review. In the
above described continuum, full substantive review comes closer to de novo
review, while good faith review comes closer to clear error.
Three principles have also to be borne in mind in this respect: the principle de minimis non curat lex should find application here,207 and the absolute limits of every system of adjudication, namely the principles audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua.208 Procedural safeguards
generally should be respected. In any case of a clear violation of disclosure
rules, the arbitrator should be considered to be biased and as a result be disqualified.209
The same should also apply in inter-State arbitration. As we have seen,
the courts and tribunals largely apply the same standard of independence for
their adjudicators. In Mauritius v. U.K. we saw the Tribunal, composed of a
majority of international judges, declare a differentiated standard of independence in the case of inter-State conflicts,210 including cases before courts
205

See generally DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW
(Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014).
206
See, e.g., Schill, supra note 89; see generally Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in
Investor-State Arbitration, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 197 (2013); Valentina Vadi & Lukasz
Gruszczynski, Standards of Review in International Investment Law and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the Commonweal, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2013).
207
See Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 462.
208
See Giacinto della Cananea, Due Process for Foreign Investors: Trans-national Standards of Procedural Fairness (draft, on file with the author); Buechel, supra note 5, at 243 (“Arbitrators are often
closely involved in the market that appoints them, which arise the issues of them being partial, biased,
pre-disposed and being interested in the outcome of arbitration. The long-standing norms that no one
should be a judge in his own cause and that justice should be seen to be done apply equally to international arbitration.”); see also Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at
462.
209
See also Rogers, supra note 22, at 111–12.
210
See also Meron, supra note 58, at 368; but see Shany & Horovitz, supra note 58, at 128–29;
Seibert-Fohr, supra note 148, at 771 (for a critique of the relevant practice).
AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
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and arbitral tribunals, in comparison to private-State, or private-private conflicts. The higher disqualification standard of review as described in the
previous paragraphs should apply also for the chairperson in inter-State investment cases.
For both tests, there has to be a further adaptation to investor-State arbitration requirements. The special character of investment law and arbitration speaks for a specific interpretation of the “reasonable observer,” or
“third party.” Given the public character of international investment arbitration, there is a need to define the third party in a different way than in other
fields of arbitration. A large part of the imaginary observer should be constituted from the population of the host country.211 Through this clause, the
law and practice of international investment arbitration can respond to the
global and domestic public interest.212 A step in this direction is to be found
in the “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration.”213 They specify in Article 1(4)(a) that where the arbitral tribunal is exercising a discretion to decide on the transparency of the proceedings, the tribunal should take into account both the public interest in transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration and the disputing parties’
interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute.
IV. CONTROL MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
As a response to dissatisfaction among some participants and observers with the overall structure of the investor-State arbitration system and the
results it produces,214 several proposals have been suggested as alternatives
to the current system.215 Some of these proposals include a fundamental reshaping of the current system, while others propose the introduction of control systems. Five major proposals will be presented briefly here: (1) the
abolishment of party-appointed arbitrators; (2) the introduction of an appeal
mechanism; (3) the establishment of an international investment court; (4)
211

Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5, at 165 (with reference to ,EDF International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Challenge Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler,
¶ 74
(June
25,
2008),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0262.pdf) (“Focusing primarily on the parties to the dispute, the Orange List disregards a
key stakeholder in the investment arbitration process: the host state’s populace. Otherwise stated, who is
the “reasonable observer” against whose views the arbitrator’s apparent independence is to be measured?”); see also id. at 171–75.
212
Cf. also Luttrell, Bias Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 5, at 475.
213
The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration are effective
from April 1, 2014.
214
See generally Brower & Blanchard, supra note 19.
215
See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see generally THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS (Jose E. Alvarez, Karl P. Sauvant, Kamil
Girard Ahmed & Gabriela P. Vizcaino eds., 2011).
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the introduction of binding codes of conduct; and (5) the resort to the old
means of diplomacy and dispute resolution through domestic courts. With
the exception of the fourth proposal, the proposed reforms go either in the
direction of a further judicialization of investment arbitration, or returning
to the old status quo with the hope that this time it will work.
After discussing these proposals, I will then put forward my suggestion for the improvement of the current system so that arbitration remains
an effective alternative to the courts. A system of market-based regulation
focusing on the arbitration community and the person of the arbitrator could
be a solution to the balancing of independence and control beyond any major institutional reform.
A. The Need for Accountability Mechanisms
As in the field of international courts, the increasing judicialization
and independence moves of the international investment tribunals leads to
an increased need for accountability216 or control mechanisms:217
“To say that judges should be independent, that they should base their
decisions on the facts of individual cases rather than in response to outside
pressure is one thing. But to say that courts in general should not be held
accountable by the public and by the other branches is to ask for a protection no democratic society should grant.”218
The same applies to international investment arbitration.219
Controls over decisions are a prerequisite for international third party
decision-making.220 If the control and accountability mechanisms of the ad216

See generally Paul Mahoney, The International Judiciary – Independence and Accountability, 7
L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 313 (2008); Dinah Shelton, Legal Norms to Promote the Independence and Accountability of International Tribunals, 2 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 27
(2003); Ronli Sifris, Weighing Judicial Independence against Judicial Accountability: Do the Scales of
the International Criminal Court Balance?, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 88 (2008).
217
See sources cited supra note 21; see also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 141 (2001).
218
Charles H. Franklin, Behavioral Factors Affecting Judicial Independence, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 148, 150 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
219
REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL, supra note 21, at 1 (“Arbitration is a delegated and restricted
power to make certain types of decisions in certain prescribed ways. Any restricted delegation of power
must have some system of control. Controls are techniques or mechanisms in engineered artifacts,
whether physical or social, whose function is to ensure that an artifact works the way it was designed to
work. In social and legal arrangements in which a limited power is delegated, control systems are essential; without them the putative restrictions disappear and the limited power may become absolute . . . .
Nor should controls be conceived in a negative sense. Controls are necessary not only for efficient operation. Effective controls are the only assurance of limited government. In this sense controls are a sine
qua non of liberty.”).
220
Id. at 2.
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judication bodies fail, then many actors may refrain from using the system.221 This might explain why states resort less often than expected to international courts. For this reason, controls in international adjudication and
arbitration are not only conditions for the efficient functioning of the system, but “conditions of operation.”222 In the same way as appearance of bias
operates with regard to judicial independence, at least an “appearance of accountability” has to be present in international arbitration. Mechanisms
need to be developed that will bring an equilibrium between independence,
control and accountability. These new mechanisms will attract more actors
that until now have chosen not to participate in the system, such as Brazil,
into investment arbitration, and they will reverse the recent trend of abandoning investment arbitration.
The new system should achieve a new “degree of independence”,223 or
what Professors Helfer and Slaughter call “constrained independence”.224
The difficult part of the institutional design for international arbitration is
that constrained independence has to be achieved in a market-context, on
the one side, and in a field of increased political sensitivity and significant
economic importance, on the other. In the words of Yuval Shany, referring
generally to international adjudication:
The focus of our attention should therefore shift from discussing the
existence and desirability of an ‘ideal type’ of judicial independence—a discussion premised on a monolithic understating of the international judicial function, to a study of the nuts and bolts of the
constraints put on international courts in the unique institutional and
normative environments in which they operate.225

A further judicialization step in the field of international investment
arbitration might undermine the existence of the field itself.226 Even if this
might not be a negative evolution as such, it might undermine the investment regime as a whole, and thus have detrimental effects on countries in
need of capital inflows from foreign investors. Moreover, with the rise of
221

Id.
Id.
223
Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin Stotzky ed., 1993); see also Owen M. Fiss, Judicial
Independence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Leonard Levy and Kenneth Karst
eds., 2nd ed. 2000) (both on the idea of the “degree of independence” of judges).
224
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 58, at 44–56; Shany, supra note 2, at 261–67; see generally Tom
Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631 (2005) (discussing “bounded discretion”); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 A.J.I.L. 247 (elucidating the concept of “strategic space”).
225
Shany, supra note 2, at 262–63.
226
See Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr.
2003, at 37, 38 (2003); Park, supra note 5, at 693–94.
222
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the BRICS and other (former) developing countries, developed countries
could also benefit from capital inflows. In addition, even if the system does
not collapse, it is not certain that the next step in its development will necessarily be positive. Investors may either resort to domestic courts, or other
means of alternative dispute resolution.227 The success of the first possible
exit from the system is dependent on the quality of the domestic courts. The
second possible exit might lead to opposite results from that which even the
proponents of the public law judicialization of investment arbitration would
want; namely to less juridified and judicialized dispute resolution by means
of conciliation or mediation. This has happened in other fields, and in domestic law, and may also happen in investment arbitration. So, more (law)
could mean less (law). Moreover, according to Stavros Brekoulakis, if some
of the proposals such as the abolishment of party-appointment or the establishment of a standing international investment court are adopted, there is a
great danger that the “pluralistic, diverse and democratic potential of international arbitration” will be undermined.228 Given the current structure of
the system, reforms in arbitration would rather need to enhance ideological
pluralism and prevent homogeneity.229
B. Alternatives to the Current System
Recently, there have been proposals by very eminent and highly influential arbitration practitioners and scholars proposing the reform of investor-State dispute resolution.230 Similar proposals have also been formulated
by international organizations like the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD).231 The different proposals range from increasing transparency of the investor-arbitration system232 to introducing
new institutional mechanisms like a system of preliminary rulings in inter227

See also Henckels, supra note 206, at 199 (2013) (“If adjudicators employ overly strict standards
of review, this may give rise to compliance issues, reform of relevant legal instruments to curtail adjudicative discretion, or withdrawal of states from the court or tribunal’s jurisdiction—all of which are situations that have arisen in international investment law.”).
228
Brekoulakis, supra note 5, at 557.
229
Id. at 582. As examples of this kind Professor Brekoulakis mentions the increase of the number
of arbitrators sitting in a case from one or three to five, the enlargement of the pool and cultural diversity
of potential arbitrators and capacity-building programs.
230
See generally Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the
Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 885 (2007).
231
See UNCTAD, supra note 20.
232
See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Rules on Transparency in TreatyBased Investor-State Arbitration, U.N. G.A. Res. 68/109 (Dec. 16, 2013); Mauritius Convention on
Transparency,
opened
for
signature
Mar.
17,
2015,
54
I.L.M.
747,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-TransparencyE.pdf.
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national investment arbitration.233 This subsection discusses some of these
proposals.
1. Abolishment of Party-Appointed Arbitrators
For reasons that become clear after an analysis of the (lack of) institutional guarantees in international investment arbitration in contrast to international courts, prominent international arbitration practitioners and scholars like Jan Paulsson and Jan van den Berg have proposed the abolishment
of the system of party-appointment in international investment arbitration.234 It has been suggested instead that all members of an arbitral tribunal
should be appointed by arbitral institutions. The institutional selection of
arbitrators would allow for more transparency in the appointing process and
better control of the quality of the appointed arbitrators.
Despite the possible merits of this system with regard to enhanced institutional independence, the adoption of this proposal would mean that the
international investment system would lose many of its positive aspects.
The tribunals would lose the ability to glean major insights into the facts of
each case and the specificities of each individual party that can be provided
by party-appointed arbitrators. Losing the power to appoint an arbitrator,
the actors may moreover stop resorting to arbitration overall.
2. Appeal Mechanism
One of the most popular ideas put forward for reform is to introduce a
second instance or appellate body, like the WTO Appellate Body.235 An ap233

See generally Christoph H. Schreuer, Preliminary Rulings in Investment Arbitration, in APPEALS
MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 207 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008).
234
Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL
REISMAN 821, 834 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011); see generally Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in
International Dispute Resolution: Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished
Scholar Chair Before the University of Miami Law School, in 25 ICSID INVESTMENT L.J. 339 (2010);
Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 33
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_33.pdf ; but see Charles N. Brower &
Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, GLOBAL ARB. REV.
(2012),
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/Charles_Brower_The_Death_of_the_Two
-Headed_Nightingale_Speech_2.pdf ; Giorgio Sacerdoti, Is the Party Appointed Arbitrator a “Pernicious Institution”? A Reply to Professor Hans Smit, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 35 (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_35.pdf. See also Trakman, supra note 92, at 660 (on the introduction of standing panels).
235
APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2008);
Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179 (2005);
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: Lessons from Amco Asia and CME, in
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peal mechanism has the advantage of keeping the basic structure of the system untouched, while introducing an additional review layer in order to increase consistency in awards. Another major advantage of this proposal is
that it could help investment arbitration develop in a more transparent way,
given that, one way or another, annulment has in practice started playing the
role of appeal with the ICSID ad hoc committees interpreting the annulment
grounds very expansively.
This institutional development might be a necessary step in ICSID arbitration, given that it is the arbitration system where controls, international
or domestic, are least effective. An appeal mechanism, though, will not create the necessary incentives for further improvements in the direction of encouraging new arbitrators to enter the market. An appellate stage might also
increase the costs and time involved for the resolution of investment disputes.236
3. Standing International Investment Court
The proposal involving the most rigorous reshaping of dispute resolution in the international investment regime has been put forward by Professor Gus Van Harten.237 Van Harten proposes to replace investment arbitration with a permanent international investment court with tenured judges
subject to the supervision of national courts or an appellate body, because
private arbitrators are allegedly not in the position to resolve public law is-

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA,
BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 471, 479 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes:
Prospects and Challenges, 39 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 39, 43–44 (2006); Christian J. Tams, An Appealing
Option? The Debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure, ESSAYS TRANSNAT’L ECON. L., June 2006, at
57; see also Trakman, supra note 92, at 662 (“Seventeenth, the ICSID needs an appellate body with jurisdiction beyond annulment proceedings, including expanded grounds of appeal and remedies. Such an
appellate body can also help render ICSID jurisprudence more consistent.”); Bottini, supra note 5, at
365–66. The European Commission is also currently working on this idea. See EUROPEAN COMM’N,
FACT SHEET: INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND INVESTOR-TO-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN EU
AGREEMENTS 9 (Nov. 23, 2013). See generally Noemi Gal-Or, The Concept of Appeal in International
Dispute Settlement, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 43 (2008).
236
UNCTAD, supra note 20, at 8.
237
See VAN HARTEN, supra note 29, at 180–84; Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court (June 30, 2008), Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference
2008, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153424 [hereinafter Van Harten, International Investment Court]; Van
Harten, supra note 88, at 627; Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 175–84 (Michael Waibel et al. eds, 2010); see also
Alec Stone Sweet & Florian Grisel, Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to Constitutionalization?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 135, 118–
36 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); Andreas Bucher, Is there a Need to Establish a Permanent
Review Body?, 6 REV. INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 285 (2010).
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sues.238 This goes together with an understanding that international courts
are the best adjudication fora for international disputes. The tenure of judges of a permanent court would lead to an increase in the independence and
impartiality of the adjudicators since tenured judges would not have any potential future appointments in mind as arguably arbitrators do.
This proposal speaks for a complete departure from the current system
and is worth consideration by any person interested in the values of adjudicator independence and accountability. The users of arbitration, including
developing and developed states and investors would then have to decide
whether they prefer the virtues of arbitration despite its vices. In view of the
general global trend to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) instead of
courts, appointing tenured judges cannot be viewed as a viable solution.
Given that both states and investors will always have exit options through
recourse to the traditional international law dispute resolution mechanisms,
we might end up with a court similar to the ICJ.
4. Codes of Conduct
Given the current partial collapse of control systems in international
arbitration, the European Commission has also put forward its own proposal
for reform of international investment arbitration, or “investor-state dispute
settlement” (ISDS).239 The European Union is the largest economy in the
world and the Lisbon Treaty of 2008 made negotiating investment agreements an EU competence.240 It is expected that changes in the EU systems
of control will have a systemic impact on international investment arbitration overall.
The European Commission proposes changes to improve both investment protection rules and dispute settlement.241 Major concerns with regard
to dispute settlement are “conflicts of interests” and “consistency of arbitral
awards.”242 The EU has drafted a code of conduct with specific obligations
for arbitrators which is supposed to be introduced in future trade and investment agreements of the EU with its partners.243 The code already forms
part of the negotiated agreement of the EU with Canada. According to European Commission reports, as the code has not yet been made public, it includes provisions on conflicts of interests and broader questions on the eth238

Van Harten, International Investment Court, supra note 237.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 235.
240
See Regulation 1219/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements Between Member States
and Third Countries, 2012 O.J. (L 351/40)
241
EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 235, 7.
242
Id. at 9.
243
Cf. also Rogers, supra note 22, 110–12 (on the adoption of codes of conduct for international
arbitrators).
239
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ics and conduct of arbitrators.244
This effort to regulate the conduct of arbitrators is accompanied by the
introduction of a list of individuals who can act as arbitrators in a particular
dispute, an approach also found in the ICSID Convention. This “list approach” has the major difference in the case of the EU-Canada free trade
agreement (CETA) in comparison to the ICSID in that the individuals on
the list will have to be chosen by both the EU and Canada on the basis of
expertise, and there will be an obligation for them to comply with the code
of conduct.
The system proposed by the EU includes very interesting elements for
the future regulation of international investment arbitration because it addresses the arbitration community as such. I believe that this mode of arbitrator regulation could develop within a system of co-regulation, as will be
described later in the text, which would be greeted with much more acceptance by the arbitration community.
5. Going Back: Diplomacy and Domestic Courts
Currently, there are even some proposals to go back to the traditional
means of solving international disputes. In every international dispute involving foreign nationals, the traditional way of resolving investor-State
disputes has been diplomacy.245 Some current proposals include a return to
diplomatic protection in international investment law.246 Moreover, diplomacy has recently made a come-back with a more modern face. UNCTAD,
for example, has elaborated a toolkit for dispute resolution using the means
of classical international law—negotiation, conciliation and mediation or
other managed conflict prevention measures like good offices and enquiry—in a more structured way within the BITs.247
These measures may end up being ineffective by causing delays to
dispute resolution instead of offering solutions.248 The measures are more
geared towards dispute prevention and avoidance rather than dispute resolution. Even though it is preferable for states to resolve their disputes in a
244

See EUROPEAN COMM’N, INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN THE EU-CANADA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (CETA) 3 (Sept. 26, 2014); Regulation 1219/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351/40) 9.
245
See O. Thomas Johnson, Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of
Modern International Investment Law, in Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 649–92 (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,
2010–2011).
246
M. Sornarajah, Starting Anew in International Investment Law, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 74 (July
16, 2012), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_74.pdf.
247
UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010); see also Trakman, supra
note 92, at 657–59.
248
Trackman, supra note 92, at 658 (citing Colin Picker, International Investment Law: Some Legal
Cultural Insights, in REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 27 (Leon Trakman & Nick
Ranieri eds. 2013)).
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friendly way, there is no assurance that they will not resort to litigation.249
Moreover, the tripartite quasi-judicial structure of investor-State arbitration
may then be restructured into two politicized bipartite ones. The investors,
who had in the beginning to deal only with the foreign bureaucracy, would
then have to deal with the bureaucracy of their country of origin too. As a
result, the introduction of these measures can cut both ways.250
A further proposal, partly in response to the withdrawal of Australia
from international investment arbitration, has been recently again put on the
table to go back to the system of domestic courts deciding on investor-State
issues.251 The basic argument in favor of domestic courts is that foreign and
domestic investors should be granted the same treatment.252 But, if we view
investment law as an international regime and “if domestic courts have the
final word on state-investment arbitration, domestic laws and interests are
likely to further dilute international investment law and practice.”253 Eventually, the success of a broad re-introduction of domestic courts in the resolution of international investment disputes will be highly dependent on the
quality of domestic courts.254
C. Adaptation to the Constructed Standards
1. Co-regulation
The reform proposals that have been described above are suggestions
for an institutional reshaping of international investment arbitration; each
one of a different degree of intensity. Consistent with the analysis on the
construction of arbitral independence, the best way to improve the overall
system is by focusing on the arbitration community, the arbitrators, and
249

See Mark Kantor, Negotiated Settlement of Public Infrastructure Disputes, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WÄLDE 199–222 (Todd Weiler & Freya
Baetens eds., 2011).
250
See Trakman, supra note 92, at 659.
At their best, these dispute prevention and avoidance mechanisms may discourage parties from resorting
to fractious, costly, and disruptive arbitration or litigation. At their worst, however, they may protract
investor-state conflict, delay dispute resolution, and increase its costs. Institutionalized dispute resolution options that are incorporated into bilateral investment treaties may avert litigation or arbitration, or
they may simply delay it. Conciliation may fail because one party objects to the appointment of a facilitator; or, on appointment, that facilitator may fail to secure investor-state cooperation in managing a
conflict, such as one party declining to allow consultation with non-governmental agencies.
Id.
251
See Leon E. Trakman, Investor State Arbitration or Local Courts: Will Australia Set a New
Trend?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 83 (2012); Leon E. Trakman, Foreign Direct Investment: An Australian
Perspective, 13 INT’L TRADE & BUS L. REV. 31, 48–53 (2010); Trakman, supra note 92, at 648–57.
252
David Schneiderman, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES
AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 59 (2008).
253
Trakman, supra note 92, at 605.
254
Cf. also id. at 652.
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their qualities rather than on any major institutional reform. A solution cannot include fundamental changes to the legal and institutional framework if
it is to be at all viable and accepted by all players in the field. The proposal
put forward in this Article is to regulate investor-State arbitration; yet, in a
completely different way than the alternatives proposed so far. The system
proposed here shifts the focus from the institutions to the arbitration community and the person of the arbitrator.255
In order to draw ideas on how to regulate arbitrators, one could look at
the toolkit of theories of regulation. The good news is that scholars working
in other fields of ADR like mediation have already worked out solutions
and can provide some guidance in this effort. As for the person of the arbitrator, similar to mediators, there are four possible ways to regulate them
based on a different degree of intensity of the regulatory intervention:256 (a)
a license system as with the liberal professions; (b) a system of recognition
of pre-existent private systems as in the Austrian Zivilrechts-MediationsGesetz (ZivMediatG);257 (c) a quality mark system; or (d) no regulation
such as is the current system for international commercial and investment
arbitration.
Looking at the different systems, one should try to think of ways to
make the appointment of arbitrators more objective, keeping in mind at the
same time the need for the market to define some of the features of arbitration. The appropriate institutional design would be best chosen based on the
existing characteristics of the investor-State arbitration system, namely the
existence of an arbitration community, the lack of organizational guarantees
of independence, and the operation of the arbitrators in a market for arbitrators. The market should bring its own accountability mechanisms to international investment arbitration.
My proposal is to respect both the basic structure of international investment arbitration and the propensity of the arbitration community towards self-regulation258 and introduce a system adapted to these conditions.
I propose, combining systems (b) and (c) that were presented in the previous paragraph through the introduction of a certification system in the field

255

See also Rogers, supra note 22, at 121 (calling on arbitral institutions to “engage in more active,
rigorous, and transparent . . . oversight of arbitrator conduct.”).
256
See Gerhard Wagner, Grundstrukturen eines deutschen Mediationsgesetzes [The Basic Structure
of a German Mediation Act], 74 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 794, 825 (2010).
257
Bundesgesetz über Mediation in Zivilrechtssachen [Federal Act on Mediation in Civil Matters],
June 6, 2003, BGBL I at 123, no. 29 (Ger.).
258
See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 154, at 47 (“The system of selection and self-regulation of arbitrators created by the pioneers and resembling a ‘club’ is still quite essential to the prosperity of international commercial arbitration. Despite the conflicts and differing positions taken with respect to the conduct of arbitration, the participants in the debates are still in key respects members of a common
community.”).
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of international investment arbitration.259 The arbitration market has already
created such a system in other fields, like commercial arbitration, and mediation has a relatively advanced global market-based quality assessment system.
This system could help improve openness and transparency of the
market by allowing more certified arbitrators to become eligible for selection. It would also cope with the problem of lack of information and information asymmetries in the arbitration market,260 without simultaneously
creating a bureaucratic institution for its management.261 As an institutional
guarantee for the quality of certifications, ICSID could perform the role of
the manager of the system. This method of governance is usually called
“co-regulation” or “collaborative governance” in the theory of regulation.262
The “List” system currently provided for in the ICSID Convention could
evolve into a certification system.263
259

This proposal is based on a similar evolution observed in the field of product safety, where certification and accreditation developed in the market as market instruments and the system has then been
adopted by the WTO TBT Agreement and the European Union. At the international level, the Kyoto
Protocol also uses a similar system in order to measure emission reductions by private certification bodies. See GEORGIOS DIMITROPOULOS, ZERTIFIZIERUNG UND AKKREDITIERUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN
VERWALTUNGSVERBUND (2012); see also Rogers, supra note 22, at 121 (with further references) (“Finally, as some have already suggested for the domestic context, perhaps the time has come for licensing
or certification procedures to regulate arbitrator conduct. These steps are inevitable as the pool of international arbitrators transforms from being an ad hoc collection of highly talented independent contractors into a fully formed profession.”).
260
ROGERS, supra note 26, at 338–39.
261
Catherine Rogers proposes the establishment of a new “Arbitrator Intelligence” (AI) as a private
regulator that will create an information resource about arbitrators. Id. at 340–42.
262
See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1997–1998); Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The Future of Governance, 2009 J. DISP. RES. 411
(2009).
263
See Posner & Yoo, supra note 57, at 21 (describing the pros and cons of the “list system”):
This forces states to incur the additional cost of establishing new rules for each dispute and
creates unpredictability. Some international tribunals reflect an effort to solve this problem
without adopting all of the features of true courts. The Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA), for example, was, in essence, a pool of arbitrators-in waiting. In theory, the PCA, by
providing a ready pool of arbitrators, made arbitration more attractive. But while the pool reduces the transaction costs of finding a generally able and reputable arbitrator, the states do
not necessarily have a guarantee that any particular arbitrator will be able or willing to maximize the ex ante value of the agreement between them. The transaction costs of finding an
arbitrator are a relatively small deterrent compared with the risk of selecting a biased or incompetent one. And because each dispute involves a unique combination of interests, facts,
and treaty provisions, expertise cannot be generalized. Confidence can come only as the parties repeatedly and successfully use a particular arbitrator or the pool. But why should the
states repeatedly take this risk rather than rely on their own information to select an arbitrator? This reluctance to “enter the pool” prevents resources such as the PCA from being successful. A coherent jurisprudence can only arise when states are required to use the same
body for dispute resolution.
Id. See also Rogers, The Politics, supra note 87, at 253 (mentioning the partial failure of the List of Ar-
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2. Certification in Alternative Dispute Resolution
Systems of “certification” and “accreditation” in Alternative Dispute
Resolution are quality assurance mechanisms of a person’s competence.264
The system of certification is used primarily in mediation.265 There are national and international attempts to regulate certification of mediators.266
The general tendency of the different systems is to “license” training/
certification organizations, which on their part conduct training sessions
and certify mediators. The licensing bodies may be public or private institutions. The training/certification providers may be public, private, or academic bodies—like Colorado State, Harvard, Northwestern, and Pepperdine
Universities in the United States. The international and domestic systems
usually sustain public registers of certified mediators in order to make mediation activities more transparent.
International attempts to regulate mediation might be interesting for
our purposes. The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) and the
International Mediation Institute (IMI) are two of the most famous attempts
by private global organizations to regulate the field.
CEDR, a London-based private mediation body, offers mediation
training courses internationally.267 The trainers may be lawyers, accountants, business professionals, HR professionals, architects, teachers or even
public sector officials. Candidates are eligible to be awarded a “Certificate
of Accreditation” or CEDR Accreditation and thus become “CEDR Accredbitrators system given that despite having urged by ICSID, less half of the parties to the ICSID Convention and very few from among the developing countries have made use of the right to make nominations
to the List).
264
The notions “certification” and “accreditation” in ADR are usually used interchangeably catering
for some obscurity in the systems used. The proposal elaborated in this Article uses “certification” and
“accreditation” for different functions in the system.
265
Only in rare occasions are certification schemes to be found in other ADR fields like arbitration—for arbitration, there are a few schemes in the US, and South Africa is also preparing one. See Judith Meyer, Mediators’ Alert: Now, Certification Goes Global, 26 ALTERNATIVES 57, 65 (2008) (citing
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
266
See Kelly Austin et al., Mediator Certification: What Are the Practitioners Afraid of?, 26
ALTERNATIVES 188 (2008); Conrad C. Daly, Accreditation: Mediation’s Path to Professionalism, 4 AM.
J. MEDIATION 39 (2010); W. Lee Dobbins, The Debate over Mediator Qualifications: Can They Satisfy
the Growing Need to Measure Competence Without Barring Entry into the Market?, 7 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 95 (1995); Stephanie A. Henning, A Framework for Developing Mediator Certification
Programs, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189 (1999); David A. Hoffman, Certifying ADR Providers, 40 APR
BOST. B.J. 9 (1996); Donald T. Weckstein, Mediator Certification: Why and How, 30 U.S.F. L. REV.
757 (1996); Meyer, supra note 265; Tony Willis, Mediator Accreditation: Is It a Risk? Or Quality Enhancement?, 26 ALTERNATIVES 165 (2008); Mandy Zhang, To Certify, or Not to Certify: A Comparison
of Australia and the U.S. in Achieving National Mediator Certification, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 307
(2008).
267
Negotiation and Leadership Academy, CEDR, http://www.cedr.com/skills/certificate/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
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ited Mediators” after training, which includes mock disputes and a threepart written assignment, while the “Foundation Course in Mediation Skills
Certificate” is given to acknowledge the participation to those who do not
achieve accreditation. According to CEDR, this program seeks to develop
relationship, process, and content skills.268
Corporate users of mediation, organized under the auspices of the International Mediation Institute (IMI), have also created a further initiative to
certify mediators.269 IMI is a nonprofit public-interest foundation established in The Hague and is a joint initiative of the American Arbitration Association, the Netherlands Mediation Institute and the Singapore Mediation
Centre/Singapore International Arbitration Centre. In order to become an
IMI Certified Mediator, the candidate must first be qualified for IMI Certification by a Qualifying Assessment Program (QAP) that has been approved by an IMI Independent Standards Commission (ISC).270
3. The Proposed System
The idea to certify mediators did not arise from the governments; it
originated in the market and has been taken up by public and private regulators. I propose a similar system for international investment law to the one
described above. As for the mediators, the system would not be established
as a license system, and certification would not be an obligatory requirement to practice as an investor-State arbitrator. Rather, an opt-in voluntary
system is envisaged, where nobody would be obliged to apply for certification. The objective is not to close, but to open access to a larger pool of arbitrators for investor-State arbitration. In this way, a counter network of arbitrators who have other credentials than the current ones would form and
compete network-to-network with the existent network. The proposed system of control could create the right interplay between arbitral independence and accountability.
ICSID should have a central role in the shaping of the system. ICSID
could be responsible for creating a market for certified arbitrators within the
market for investment arbitrators by, for example, improving the current
“List” system. More concretely, the ICSID Secretariat could “accredit” the
certifiers. “Accreditation” should be used for the licensing of training and
certification centers by ICSID. A different approach favoring decentralization in investor-State arbitration could also be taken. The states could be responsible for the accreditation of the certifiers. “Certification” would then
be the actual act of certifying the arbitrator based on which the arbitrator
268

Id.
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, https://imimediation.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
270
IMI Mediation Advocacy Competency Certification, INT’L MEDIATION INST.,
https://imimediation.org/imi-mediation-advocacy-competency-certification (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
269
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becomes an “ICSID certified arbitrator.”
The ICSID Secretariat would also be responsible for the development
of the standards, first, against which the arbitrators will be evaluated, and
second, defining the certification procedure. This is easier than it may first
sound, since there are already ISO and other standards for the provision of
similar services271 that could be used by ICSID. Additionally, through this
co-/self-regulatory approach, the arbitrator community should be involved
in the stipulation of the standards of conduct in the form of a “code of conduct.” Instead of having an external institution elaborating the standards, as
proposed by the European Commission, a code of conduct could be evolved
by the arbitration community itself within reasonable time and then adopted
by ICSID.
It is expected that the arbitrators might oppose the introduction of the
proposed system.272 In mediation, one of the major concerns is that certification will affect diversity among mediators,273 which will lead to less flexibility and innovation in the market of mediators.274 Both concerns are not a
problem in the current structure of the system of investment arbitration; the
market as it is now structured faces the exact opposite problems with a
largely homogeneous group of people dominating the field.275 From the
point of view of the users, in mediation, one further concern is that it could
increase the costs of hiring mediators.276 This is again not a problem in investment arbitration since arbitrator remunerations are already high277 and
recourse to arbitration is obligatory under International Investment Agreements. If newcomers enter the market based on the proposed system, the
costs might even decrease in the long run.
Certification should lead then to an overall standardization of international investment arbitration. At the same time, it should also lead to a further “professionalization” of international investment arbitrators, in the
sense of creating a profession similar to doctors or lawyers.278 As observed
above, professionalization is already a trend within the arbitration commu271

See ISO/IEC 17024:2012, Conformity assessment – General requirements for bodies operating
certification of persons.
272
Meyer, supra note 265, at 65 (for similar reactions in the field of mediation).
273
KHAMISI GRACE, ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CERTIFICATION: DISASTER FOR
DIVERSITY? WHAT IMPACT, IF ANY, WOULD REQUISITE CERTIFICATION HAVE ON DIVERSITY AMONG
MEDIATOR
PRACTITIONERS?
2
(2011),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.201.264&rep=rep1&type=pdf).
274
Dobbins, supra note 266, at 97.
275
See also supra Part III.A.1.
276
Dobbins, supra note 266, at 98.
277
DIANA ROSERT, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STAKES ARE HIGH: A REVIEW OF THE
FINANCIAL COSTS OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 10-11 (2014), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/stakesare-high-review-financial-costs-investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf.
278
Daly, supra note 266, at 51.
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nity and has been since at least the 1980s. Further professionalization will
increase arbitrators’ duty to investigate and disclose significant relationships that might call into question their independence279 and might lead arbitrators to step down voluntarily in cases of conflicts of interest. More
broadly, it will reduce the dangers of moral hazard that are created by the
closed nature of the community and the absence of mechanisms of professional discipline.280
Market information can affect arbitrator selection and reappointment
to arbitration tribunals and hence have an impact on their behavior.281 Professor Rogers has made the point that it is necessary to create a system that
will be in the position to manage and better disseminate information on arbitrators. In order to achieve this, she has proposed the creation of a new
private regulator to manage the information system.282 Certification could
achieve the same or even better results without the need to create additional
institutional structures. International investment arbitrators are “intermediaries of law.”283 They structure information. For this reason, it is important
to build the new information system around them and not around a bureaucratic institution. Certification would partially replace reputation and wordof-mouth recommendation of arbitrators. It is thus expected that the introduction of certification will boost the dissemination of information across
the system. Additionally, arbitrators could be obliged to make information
available online regarding their arbitration-related and other work.
Finally, the proposed system would open the door to new arbitrators
without closing it to the current ones. While the number of arbitrators has
increased in the past, the market is still relatively closed,284 and there are
only very few arbitrators from developing countries285 and women arbitrators.286 If appointments were not only based on reputation, but also on a
279

See Park, supra note 5, at 654–55; see generally Rubins & Lauterburg, supra note 5 (on the duty
to disclose in investor-State arbitration).
280
See ROGERS, supra note 26, at 341–42.
281
See Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 83 (1996).
282
ROGERS, at supra note 26, at 340–42.
283
DROIT ET RÉGULATIONS DES ACTIVITÉS ÉCONOMIQUES ET INSTITUTIONALISTES [LAW AND
REGULATIONS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND INSTITUTIONS] (Christian Bessy, Thierry Delpeuch &
Jerôme Pélisse eds., 2011); Christian Bessy, Law, Forms of Organization and the Market for Legal Services, ECON. SOC., Nov. 2012, at 20 (commenting both on the notion of intermediaries of law),
http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_soc_14-2.pdf.
284
ROGERS, supra note 26, at 967–69 (concerning commercial arbitration).
285
Nathan, supra note 5, at 19 (“Unfortunately, this rule [Rule 1 ICSID Arbitration Rules] has effectively put arbitrators from the developing countries out of ICSID arbitrations because arbitrators from
developing countries are rarely known outside their own countries and state parties in ICSID arbitrations
are all developing countries except for the anomaly in Mobil Corporation and others v New Zealand
Government (ICSID Case No ARB/87/2).”).
286
See Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, no. 59, at 1 (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/lack-
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formal assurance of competence, and if information was better disseminated
on the arbitration market, newcomers from the developing and developed
world would have more chances to enter the market.
Standardization, professionalization, and transparency could thus lead
to an overall better legitimization of the investment arbitration system.287
More legitimacy of the system would eventually lead to the withholding of
the “backlash” against investor-State arbitration288 and eventually to attracting more and more states to the system.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes understanding arbitral independence in investment arbitration as a construct of the international arbitration community in
its interplay with further actors in the field and the historical evolution of
international arbitration. This can serve as a tool to better explain the current legal status quo, make proposals for systemic reforms, and make predictions for the future.
In the different fora of investment arbitration, a common standard of
arbitrator independence has been developed by the arbitration community
itself. The arbitration community, in the search for legitimacy and maximization of profits, has gradually adopted a standard for commercial and investment arbitration that is similar to, and sometimes even higher than, the
judicial independence standard. Based on the understanding that investorState arbitration is a unique creature of international law beyond commercial arbitration and public law adjudication, a situationally adapted standard
of arbitral independence has been developed in this Article that leads to a
distinction of the disqualification standard of review for party-appointed
and non-party-appointed arbitrators in ICSID.
Moreover, the understanding of investor-State arbitration as a constructed field led to the proposal of introducing certification as a control
system for the improvement of the current regime. Overall, according to the
proposal, the system of investor-State arbitration should move towards a
system of co-regulation, combining elements from both government regulation and market self-regulation. In comparison to other proposals, it is much
easier to implement since it focuses on the community of arbitrators and
does not involve any major institutional reform.
Concerning the future development of the independence standard in
investment arbitration, it could be predicted that arbitrators will have the
tendency to avoid taking decisions concerning their fellow arbitrators. Rewomen-arbitrators-investment-treaty-arbitration.
287
Cf. Daly, supra note 266, at 50–54 (concerning mediators).
288
See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel, Asha
Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010).
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ferrals to other bodies will remain steady. When these bodies are administrative officials in ICSID arbitration, I would expect that they apply the letter of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention 289 and the appearance of bias test
when they are judges. At the same time, when arbitrators are ready to overcome the community spirit and disqualify the proposal, I expect them to also apply the higher standard that they have themselves societally shaped in
the different international arbitral fora. In the long run, it may yet be that
this exceedingly high standard of independence will be corrected in favor of
a less demanding standard when the international arbitration community
achieves a greater level of legitimacy within the international community.

289

E.g., Burlington Resources, Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶¶ 65–66 (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3028.pdf.

434

